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Social License to Operate: Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges 
 Facing the Oil & Gas Industry 





The crossroads of urban development and improved technology allowing oil and gas development in new 
areas can result in contentious community issues. The debate over one of the improved technologies – i.e., 
hydraulic fracturing – can be highly emotional. Consequently, industry must address community issues, 
earning trust and therefore a “social license to operate.” This paper provides fundamental knowledge of 
the social license to operate concept, validates its application to the oil and gas industry, particularly with 
respect to shale gas development, discusses the current status of social license in the unconventional 
development sphere, analyzes current ongoing efforts for shale gas developers to monitor and establish a 
social license, and identifies potential new methods of encouraging, establishing, and monitoring a social 
license to operate. The paper also proposes a new institutional framework in which to promote the social 





Within the past decade, two key technologies have dramatically changed the landscape of oil and gas 
development, in turn drawing a great deal of attention to the “Shale Revolution”: horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing.1 These technologies, coupled with population growth and urban sprawl, have 
attracted a great deal of scrutiny to shale development. These technologic breakthroughs have also led to 
a paradigm shift in energy scholarship. Many shale resources that were previously considered 
unrecoverable are now economically recoverable. Interestingly enough, a significant portion of these 
shale resources encroach upon urban developments. As many as 300 million people around the world 
across six continents occupy land overlying a shale reservoir.2 Large-scale industrial extraction of shale 
will no doubt impact these urban developments. Whether or not the impacts will be positive or negative 
for these local communities largely rests with industry’s approach to development.3  
 
                                                            
*Don C. Smith is Director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Law & Policy Graduate Program at the 
University of Denver, CO, Sturm College of Law.  He can be reached at dcsmith@law.du.edu. Jessica M. Richards 
is Land Administration Supervisor at Jonah Energy in Denver, CO. She can be reached at 
jessica.richards@jonahenergy.com. The authors would like to recognize the important contributions made by 
Autumn Aspen and RJ Colwell. 
 
1 Nathan Richardson, et. al., The State of State Shale Gas Regulation, RES. FOR THE FUTURE 3 (June 2013) available 
at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-Rpt-StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf. 
2 Thomas G. Measham, David A. Fleming, Correspondence: Assess Benefits and Costs of Shale Energy, 50 NATURE 
473 (June 26, 2014). 
3 Id. 
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4 
The oil and gas exploration and production processes are increasingly the topic of discussion in 
the media, and not always with positive connotation. In the United States, a 2012 Gallup Poll reported 
that almost two-thirds of Americans have a negative view of the oil and gas industry.5 A newspaper in the 
heart of shale development in Colorado went so far to say the “process of hydraulic fracturing for oil and 
gas is perhaps one of the most misunderstood drilling practices, becoming as bad of a word in some 
circles as a racial slur.”6 Moreover, some local communities have taken matters in to their own hands, 
going so far as suspending or banning hydraulic fracturing activities within city limits.7 
 
Around the world, resistance from local communities continues to threaten shale development. 
Shale resources often go undeveloped, not for the lack of a legal license, but rather for the lack of a social 
license.8 Many local communities express concerns about the impacts of shale development including 
ground and surface water protection, air quality, and increased traffic, dust, and noise.9 However, 
“popular concerns about potential hazards to personal health and safety are often inconsistent with 
                                                            
4 Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 
Countries Outside the United States, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/. 
5 Rachael Seeley, Shale’s social license, OIL & GAS JOURNAL 16 (July 21, 2014). 
6 Sharon Dunn, Fracking 101: Breaking Down the Most Important Part of Today’s Oil, Gas Drilling, THE GREELEY 
TRIBUNE (Jan. 5, 2014), available at http://www.greeleytribune.com/news/9558384-113/drilling-oil-equipment-
wellbore. 
7 Clifford Kraus, Split Decision by Voters on Local Fracking Bans, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/business/energy-environment/split-decision-by-voters-on-local-
fracking-bans-.html?_r=0.  
8 Interview by Stephanie Joyce with Alex Hohmann, Stakeholder Relations Manager for Anadarko Petroleum, in 
Relationships 101: Oil and Gas Looks for a Social License to Operate, WYOMING PUBLIC RADIO (Dec., 5 2014), 
available at https://insideenergy.org/2014/12/05/relationships-101-oil-and-gas-look-for-a-social-license-to-operate/. 
9 CNEE Powering Forward Full Report, CENTER FOR THE NEW ENERGY ECONOMY, COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY 
92, available at http://cnee.colostate.edu/graphics/uploads/CNEE-Powering-Forward-Full-Report.pdf. 
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scientific evidence regarding the probability or risk that such hazards will actually happen.”10 Regardless 
of whether the hazards are probable, the mere presence of potential hazards creates a stigma of harm.11 A 
stigma of harm, whether founded in fact, fiction, or emotion, must be addressed by companies wishing to 
explore for and develop shale resources.  
 
In an effort to address the impacts of shale development on local communities, several energy 
development scholars recommend that operators obtain a “social license to operate” in communities near 
extractive industry projects. The process of obtaining a social license to operate includes, among other 
things, early as well as ongoing communication with communities, transparency and engagement in 
decision-making, and the establishment of effective conflict resolution mechanisms.12 While the concept 
of social license to operate emerged from and evolved to become a standard business practice in the 
mining industry over the past nearly two decades, the concept of social license to operate is in its infancy 
in the oil and gas industry. This paper seeks to provide fundamental knowledge about “social license to 
operate,” validate its application to the oil and gas industry, particularly shale gas development, discuss 
current ongoing efforts for shale gas developers to monitor and establish a social licenses, and identify 
potential shale gas industry practices to earn a social license to operate.  
 
IMPACTS OF NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT  
 
In recent years, natural gas has emerged as the preferred fossil fuel to bridge the gap between fossil fuel 
dependence and renewable energy. Natural gas has a wide variety of uses for residential use, commercial 
use, electricity generation, industrial use, and vehicle fuel.13 When compared to other fossil fuels, natural 
gas is considered cleaner because it releases fewer harmful pollutants.14 It has been dubbed the most 
environmentally friendly and the “cleanest” fossil fuel.15 For example, natural gas combustion releases 
approximately half as much carbon dioxide as coal and 30 percent less carbon dioxide than oil, and 
significantly fewer pollutants per unit of energy.16 Moreover, natural gas emits 15 to 20 percent less heat-
trapping gases than gasoline when burned in vehicles.17  
 
  However, the natural gas exploration, drilling, production, and consumption processes are not 
without an environmental footprint. Critics note that the drilling and producing processes can contaminate 
groundwater, release air pollution including methane, disrupt wildlife habitats and negatively impact local 
communities.18 Natural gas emissions occur during both the production process and the combustion, or 
consumption, process. In the U.S., natural gas production process results in venting or flaring of other 
fugitive methane releases, attributable to approximately two percent of total emissions, while natural gas 
combustion process causes approximately 21 percent of annual greenhouse gas emissions. Globally, 
natural gas combustion in 2011 accounted for 20.2 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions 
                                                            
10 Ian Thomson, Understanding and Managing Public Reaction to ‘Fracking’, 33 J. OF ENERGY & NATURAL RES. 
LAW (2015). 
11 Id. 
12 Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring the origins of “social license to operate” in the mining sector: 
Perspectives from governance and sustainability theories, 37 RESOURCES POLICY 346, 347 (2012). 
13 Why is Natural Gas a Better Fossil Fuel?, INNOVATEUS, http://www.innovateus.net/climate/why-natural-gas-
better-fossil-fuel. 
14 Natural Gas, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/energy/source/natural-gas. 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas: Global Warming Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, available 
at http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/environmental-impacts-of-
natural-gas.html#.VRbQdk10yUk.  
18 Nathan Richardson, et.al., supra note 1, at 5. 
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attributable to production and consumption of fossil fuels.19 It is important to note that natural gas 
extraction and transportation processes results in methane release, which is different from carbon dioxide 
release and is considered by many to be a more potent global warming gas than carbon dioxide.20 21 
 
   Despite its downfalls, natural gas is still the preferred fossil fuel of the future. Its abundance 
makes it a desirable alternative to other non-renewable resources, and its relative cleanliness compared to 
other fossil fuels – such as crude oil and coal – make it the preferred option in fossil fuel development.22  
 
HORIZONTAL DRILLING AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
  
A discussion of social license is relevant today largely because of the technological advances of 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. A common misconception is that the two technologies are 
synonymous with the drilling process; however, horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing are two 
distinct, separate processes that might be applied to an oil and gas drilling and production operation.  
 
Horizontal drilling allows an operator to drill laterally, potentially covering more surface area of a 
shale resource than drilling vertically might accomplish.23 On the other hand, hydraulic fracturing 
involves injecting water, sand and chemicals into a geologic formation to create fractures in the rock to 
increase permeability, thereby increasing the flow of oil and/or gas out of low permeability rocks.24 
Neither of these technologies is new. For example, hydraulic fracturing has been used in the United States 
since at least 1948.25 However, it is the mastering of the processes and the ability to conduct them 
economically that makes their use so widespread today.  
 
CONVENTIONALS V. UNCONVENTIONALS 
 
Unconventional natural gas development, which highly utilizes the processes of horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing, is distinguishable from conventional gas development. While both processes result 
in the extraction of natural gas, conventional and unconventional recovery processes are distinct.  
 
Conventional natural gas development, used for over 100 years, refers to the traditional process of 
extracting oil and gas from reservoirs below the earth’s surface. In this process, gas is trapped in various 
porous zones of rock, typically in smaller volumes, which are relatively easy to develop.26 For most 
conventional wells, operators utilize vertical drilling methods, and hydraulic fracturing is not necessary to 
recover the gas in place. Under conventional methods, the porosity of the rock is adequate enough to 
allow for a sufficient flow of gas out of the well.27  
 
                                                            
19 Natural Gas, supra note 14. 
20 Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas: Global Warming Emissions, supra note 16. 
21 These impacts, however, can be attributed to shale gas development regardless of whether conventional or 
unconventional drilling and production methods are used. See Nathan Richardson, supra note 1. 
22 Why is Natural Gas a Better Fossil Fuel?, supra note 13. 
23 Nathan Richardson, et al., supra note 1. 
24 Hydraulic Fracturing, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
http://energy.usgs.gov/OilGas/UnconventionalOilGas/HydraulicFracturing.aspx. 
25 Thomas E. Kurth, Understanding Hydraulic Fracturing Issues, Challenges and Regulatory Regime, PRACTICAL 
LAW GROUP 1 (2012).  
26 Conventional & Unconventional, CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF PETROLEUM PRODUCERS, 
http://www.capp.ca/canadaIndustry/naturalGas/Conventional-Unconventional/Pages/default.aspx.  
27 Formation of Natural Gas and Current Reserves, EON, http://www.eon.com/en/business-areas/exploration-and-
production/what-is-e-and-p/formation-of-natural-gas-and-reserves.html. 
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Unconventional gas development is a more recent phenomenon that has emerged based on 
mastering horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology to extract natural gas from virtually 
impermeable rock with less than ideal porosity. Unconventional shale resources are typically found in 
tight sands, shale, or coal beds.28 To extract the natural gas from these tight structures, operators must 
create artificial pathways in the rock to release the natural gas.29 The unconventional drilling process 
allows for the recovery of natural gas resources from rock formations previously thought unrecoverable. 




WHY STUDY NOW? THE IMPORTANCE OF GAS IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLD ENERGY GENERATION 
   
The study of the shale gas boom and its associated social impacts is a highly relevant topic that warrants 
attention from industry, regulators, scholars, and the public. According to the United States Energy 
Information Administration’s (EIA) International Energy Outlook, natural gas will be the world’s fastest 
growing fossil fuel, with consumption rates growing at 1.5 percent per year through 2040.32 This growth 
will occur in every region of the world, and will be highly concentrated in developing countries where the 
demand for natural gas is expected to occur twice as fast as in developed countries.33 It is expected to 
occur over the next 20 years despite the dramatic recent weakening in global energy markets, and will be 
driven by ongoing economic expansion in Asia, particularly in China and India.34 Population growth and 
increases in income per person are key drivers behind the increasing demand for energy.35 According to  
Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (commenting on the recent BP Energy Outlook Report), “the 
revolution in the production of shale gas and tight oil is expected to continue, with their share in primary 
energy production rising about 10 percent in 2035.”36 
                                                            
28 Id. 
29 Additionally, in the past few years, hydraulic fracturing has been applied to some conventional wells as secondary 
recovery efforts to maximize production. 
30 Conventional & Unconventional, supra note 26.  
31 Formation of Natural Gas and Current Reserves, supra note 27. 
32 Natural Gas, supra note 14.  
33 Id. 
34 BP’s Energy Outlook 2035 in Brief, BP, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-
economics/energy-outlook/outlook-to-2035.html.  
35 Id. 
36 Martin Wolf, The riches and perils of the fossil-fuel age, FINANCIAL TIMES, March 4, 2015, at 7. 
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THE SHALE GAS BOOM & THE GOLDEN AGE OF GAS 
 
Recent innovations in the drilling and producing processes have drawn attention to what some term the 
“Shale Boom,” the “Shale Revolution” or even the “Golden Age of Gas.” These terms generally refer to a 
major shift in thinking regarding global natural gas reserves. Not more than a decade ago, there was a 
large consensus that hydrocarbon production was in a decline. But based on the above-referenced 
technologic advances, finding and producing gas in tight shale formations can now be accomplished 
economically.37   
 
The “Golden Age of Gas” ideology, as coined by the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
considers the big picture of unconventional gas development. According to IEA Executive Director Maria 
van der Hoeven, “exploiting the world’s vast resources of unconventional natural gas holds the key to a 
golden age of gas…but for that to happen, governments, industry and other stakeholders must work 
together to address legitimate public concerns about the associated environmental and social impacts.”38 
The IEA has noted that if environmental regulation is developed in line with these principles in mind, 
environmental performance will lead to a level of public acceptance that provides industry with a 
necessary “social license to operate.”39 Companies must consider the social impacts of shale gas 
extraction projects. Those companies who effectively evaluate these social impacts will be best positioned 
to earn a social license to operate from the communities surrounding the project area.   
 
II. Social license to operate  
  
Social license to operate is a tool whereby companies manage socio-political risk by conforming to a set 
of implicit rules imposed by their stakeholders.40 “While social license to operate is a fundamentally 
intangible concept, the concept does not lack definition or prescription for achievement.”41 It is an 
ongoing social contract with society that allows a project to both start and continue operating in a 
community.42 Social license to operate derives from communities’ perception of a company and its 
operations, comprised of a company’s ongoing acceptance and approval from stakeholders.43  
 
Social license to operate can be conceptualized as both a goal and as a set of rules to be 
followed.44 It is “not as simplistic as a company’s stamp of a community’s approval but rather it reflects 
                                                            
37 Edward L Morse, Welcome to the Revolution: Why Shale is the Next Shale, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141202/edward-l-morse/welcome-to-the-revolution.  
38 Interview with Maria van der Hoeven, IEA Executive Director, in James Stafford, The Golden Age of Gas, 
Possibly: Interview With the IEA, OILPRICE.COM (Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://oilprice.com/Interviews/The-
Golden-Age-of-Gas-Possibly-Interview-with-the-IEA.html. 
39 Id. 
40 Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, Measuring the Extent of a Social License to Operate: The 
Influence of Marine Biodiversity Offsets in the Oil and Gas Sector in Western Australia, 42 RESOURCES POLICY 121, 
121 (2015). 
41 John R. Owen & Deanna Kemp, Social Licence and Mining: A Critical Perspective, 38 RESOURCES POLICY 29, 32 
(2013). 
42 Damien Giurco, et. al., Responsible Mineral and Energy Futures: Views at the Nexus, 84 JOURNAL OF CLEANER 
PRODUCTION 327 (2014). 
43 Robert G. Boutilier & Ian Thomson, Modelling and Measuring the Social Licence to Operate: Fruits of a 
Dialogue Between Theory and Practice, INTERNATIONAL MINE MANAGEMENT (2011); Richard Parsons, Justine 
Lacey, & Kieren Moffat, Maintaining Legitimacy of a Contested Practice: How the Minerals Industry Understands 
its “Social License to Operate,” 41 RESOURCES POLICY 83, 84 (2014). 
44 Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, supra note 12; Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, supra note 40, 
at 121. 
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an ongoing and negotiated process where a community objection of one element of a project does not 
necessarily mean that the full support is being threatened or withdrawn.”45 Obtaining a social license to 
operate is critical for companies, since the failure to obtain this license will likely result in ongoing 
conflict and controversy with local communities.46 
 
Social license to operate is, in many respects, a risk management tool. If a company can evaluate 
its social license, the company can assess its current level of risk associated with a project and take 
measures to reduce that risk.47 Obtaining a social license to operate ensures that a company has addressed 
and reduced its socio-political risks. 
 
STAKEHOLDERS DEFINED  
 
When defining social license to operate, it important to also define and identify the “stakeholders” from 
which the social license should be earned. Stakeholders can be defined broadly or narrowly. A broad 
definition of stakeholders might include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives.”48 Under this designation, almost anybody can be 
considered a stakeholder in a company’s project. However, under a more narrow definition, “stakeholders 
bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something 
of value, in a firm.”49 This narrower definition requires that a stakeholder has some level of risk 
associated to a company’s project. Regardless of which definition is applied, stakeholders can be 
individuals, groups, or organizations, and stakeholders may or may not be part of the geographic 
community in which a project takes place.50 
Defining “stakeholders” is critical part of the social license process and can create great heartburn 
for companies. Oftentimes, there are many individuals, groups, or organizations that are potential 
stakeholders, but their involvement in a project may be so minimal that it is debatable whether they 
should be included as part of the social license evaluation process.51 Inclusion of these individuals, 
groups, or organizations is ultimately an internal business decision. Regardless of the type of definition of 
stakeholder that a company adopts, a company should clearly define and identify all potential 
stakeholders at the outset of a project.  
 
Moreover, companies oftentimes have difficulty securing a social license because the network of 
stakeholders is internally divided.52 As noted above, stakeholders can also be groups, or coalitions of 
groups.53 Therefore, companies must also be aware of the dynamics within each stakeholder group and as 
                                                            
45 Justine Lacey, Richard Parsons, & Kieren Moffat, Exploring the concept of a Social License to Operate in the 
Australian Minerals Industry, CSIRO 7 (2012). 
46 Evan J. House, Fractured Fairytales: The Failed Social License for Unconventional Oil and Gas Development, 13 
WYO. L. REV. 5, 51 (2013). 
47 Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, supra note 40, at 121. 
48 Ronald K Mitchell, Bradley R Agle, & Donna J Wood, Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and 
Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT REVIEW 853, 853 
(1997). 
49 Id. at 853-54. 
50 Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, Social License to Operate, SME MINING ENGINEERING HANDBOOK 3RD 
EDITION, SOCIETY FOR MINING, METALLURGY, AND EXPLORATION INC. 1779, 1781 (2011). 
51 Ronald K Mitchell, Bradley R Agle, & Donna J Wood, supra note 48, at 854-54.  
52 R.G. Boutilier, L.D. Black, & I. Thomson, From Metaphor to Management Tool – How the Social License to 
Operate can Stabilize the Socio-Political Environment for Business, INTERNATIONAL MINE MANAGEMENT 
CONFERENCE (2012). 
53 Id. 
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well as the relationships among existing stakeholders to define both who is aligned and who has 
influential power.54  
 
HISTORY OF SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE: EMERGENCE IN THE MINING INDUSTRY 
  
The concept of social license to operate is largely rooted in the mining industry. After several 
environmental incidents in the 1990’s, the mining industry suffered from a greatly diminished reputation 
in local communities surrounding project areas.55 In 1997, at a meeting with World Bank personnel in 
Washington, D.C., Jim Cooney, then Director of International and Public Affairs with Placer Dome, 
proposed that the mining industry act to address diminishing reputations by obtaining a “social license to 
operate.”56 Cooney’s comments were largely based on his concerns with instable governments in 
developing countries not only halting major mining projects, but also failing to include local communities 
affected by such projects in the decision-making processes. Thus, the social license concept emerged to 
include local communities in decision-making processes while paralleling the legal licensing process.57  
  
Following Cooney’s comments in 1997, the concept of social license to operate gained traction 
and continued to develop as a part of the mining industry dialogue. In 2002 the International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED) issued a report on the mining industry entitled “Breaking New 
Ground: Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development.”58 The report noted that the concept of social 
license to operate initially developed as a defense mechanism for companies to address local distrust of 
industry, and that many companies had failed to convince constituents and stakeholders that they had a 
social license to operate.59 The notion that companies should earn a social license to operate stuck, soon 
becoming part of the common vernacular in many corporate sustainability programs and implemented as 
an offensive tactic in preventing community mistrust. According to the International Council on Mining 
and Metals, by 2012, “the concept of social license to operate has been widely accepted by the mining 
industry.”60  However, the adoption and practice of social license was not met without hesitation, hurdles, 
or heartbreak. “Perhaps the greatest challenge to the value of mineral resources in recent years has 
been…social license to operate,” one former Rio Tinto executive has written.61  
  
Since its emergence in the late 1990’s in the mining industry, social license to operate has gained 
support among many stakeholder groups including “mining companies, civil society, non-governmental 
organizations, research institutions, governments, and consultants.”62 It has also been applied to other 
industries including paper manufacturing, alternative energy generation, and agriculture.63 Its widespread 
acceptance and successful application in other industrial and resource extractive industries make it an 
attractive option for application in the shale gas industry.   
                                                            
54 Id. 
55 Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1779. 
56 Id. 
57 Jen Gerson, Rise of ‘Social Licence’: Claiming They Speak for Their Community, Protest Groups are 
Undermining the Law, THE NATIONAL POST (Oct. 17, 2014), available at  
http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/10/17/rise-of-social-licence-believing-they-speak-for-their-community-protest-
groups-are-undermining-the-law/#__federated=1. 
58 Minerals Mining and Sustainable Development Final Report, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT (2002) available at http://www.iied.org/mmsd-final-report.  
59 John R. Owen & Deanna Kemp, supra note 41, at 29.  
60 In Brief: Mining’s Contribution to Sustainable Development -- An Overview, ICMM 5 (June 2012). 
61 Ken Haddow, Should Mineral Rights for Hard-Rock Minerals be Awarded by Tender?, 32 JOURNAL OF ENERGY 
& NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 335, 345 (Aug. 2014). 
62 Kieren Moffat & Airong Zhang, The Paths to Social Licence to Operate: An Integrative Model Explaining 
Community Acceptance of Mining, 39 RESOURCES POLICY 61 (2014). 
63 Id.  
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ELEMENTS OF SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE 
  
As noted, the concept of social license to operate is not without definition. Certain criteria can be applied 
to define and categorize a company’s social license. Ian Thomson and Robert Boutilier have identified 
three major criteria that a company must establish to achieve the highest level of social license: 
legitimacy, credibility and trust.64  
 
The first criterion, legitimacy, requires that a company spread awareness, listen to community 
concerns, and follow official and unofficial local norms, customs and practices.65 To establish legitimacy, 
a company should establish its legal status, inform the community on how past projects have succeeded, 
and seek community participation from all constituents, regardless of age or gender, in planning and 
decision-making66  
 
The second criterion is credibility. “When a company is regarded as credible, it is seen as 
following through on promises and dealing honestly with everyone.”67 Establishing credibility requires 
following through and taking action based on information or knowledge known by the company.68 
Credibility can be achieved by transparency and consistency in decision-making.69  
 
Trust is the final criterion of a social license to operate. Trust is the degree to which the entire 
public holds collective trust towards an organization.70 Companies should strive to achieve “full trust” 
from the public in their organization. “T]he term full trust means a broader and deeper trust. Credibility is 
a basic level of truth related to honesty and reliability. A full trust relationship is one where there is a 
willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of others.”71 When a community has trust in a company, the 
community feels confident that the company will act in the best interest of the community.72 It requires 
going beyond a company doing what it says it will do.73 It requires collaboration and develops over 
time.74 As it has been said, “Trust is hard to earn, easy to lose, and very difficult to recover once lost.”75   
 
Based on the components of legitimacy, credibility, and trust, a company can achieve four levels 
of social license to operate: withdrawal, acceptance, approval, and psychological identification with a 
project.76 The highest level of social license, psychological identification with a project, is associated with 
the least amount of risk and is ideally what companies should aim for when developing social license 
programs. However, most successful social license programs that reduce corporate risk fall within the 
approval level of social license to operate.77   
  
                                                            
64 Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, supra note 12, at 347. 





70 Kieren Moffat & Airong Zhang, supra note 62, at 61-70.  
71 Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1786. 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, supra note 12, at 347.  
77 Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1786. 
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Withdrawal is the lowest level of public acceptance. At the withdrawal level, no level of social 
license is achieved, and minerals will go undeveloped.78 This is the worst-case scenario for companies 
and can result in a community halting progress on a project.79 Community withdrawal is often marked by 
shutdown, blockade, boycott, violence, sabotage, and legal challenges to a corporate project.80  
  
Acceptance is achieved when legitimacy is recognized but a company has not yet established 
credibility. In this stage, the community does not have a particular reason to doubt a company’s 
credibility, but the community members are still reluctant about proceeding with approval of a project.81 
The acceptance level of social license to operate is troubled by recurring issues and threats from the 
community, interference by outside organizations such as non-governmental organizations, and third 
party monitoring of a project.82 
 
Approval is achieved when a company establishes both legitimacy and credibility. At the 
approval level, a community views the company as a good neighbor. At this point, a company can 
securely access the resources it needs, and the community has pride in the company’s projects.83 The 
community has a positive outlook towards projects and is happy with its existence.84 At the approval 
level, there is no longer sociopolitical risk associated with the project.85 
 
Psychological identification is achieved when a community has full trust in a company and the 
community fully supports a project.86 Rather than “us and them,” the relationship between community 
and company represents a “we,” marked by co-ownership in the project.87 At this point, the community 
will defend the company against outside criticisms or attempts to impede project movement, making this 
level unique and stronger than others.88 “Very few companies have actually succeeded in taking their 
community relations to this level.”89  
 
BUT IS SOCIAL LICENSE EVEN NECESSARY? 
 
The concept of social license has not developed without criticism. Some critics argue that achieving a 
social license is unattainable based on the nature of modern society and the structure of governments. 
These arguments are largely centered on the philosophy that perfect consensus within general society is 
impossible, and regulatory bodies exist to define legal licenses because the general public is incapable of 
agreement.90 Assuming regulatory authorities appropriately manage environmental social concerns in the 




78 Id. at 1784.  
79 Id.at 1779, 1784, 1786. 
80 Tay Wiles, What I Learned from Western Royalty, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Mar. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.hcn.org/blogs/goat/what-i-learned-from-western-royalty/print_view.  
81 Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1785. 
82 Tay Wiles, supra note 80. 
83 Id. 
84 Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1786. 
85 Id.   
86 Id.; Tay Wiles, supra note 80. 
87 Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1786. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Jen Gerson, supra note 57. 
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Moreover, social license to operate has been criticized as undermining the law.91 A social license 
may place a great deal of authority in the social, intangible, extra-legal license, thereby taking value away 
from legal licenses. Some critics go as far as to say that legitimization of social license may actually result 
in violent protest. When discussing social license to operate as it applies to Indigenous communities in 
Canada, Dwight Newman writes: 
 
any overly enthusiastic embrace of social license to operate in its mistakenly transformed 
senses is actually a rejection of the rule of law and a suggestion that Canada should become 
a less well-ordered society…over-enthusiastic embraces of social license that actually 
misinterpret it through a sort of mistake about categories thereby undermine legally 
determined rights and even legitimize physical violence. Those who have rushed to 
embrace some interpretations of social license because they are socially minded and 
support better flourishing of people in society should really think about whether they want 
to embrace a form of the concept through which they may legitimize physical 
violence…legitimization of a concept that breaks down the rule of law is not helpful to 
industry, and it is not helpful to Indigenous communities.92 
 
Social license to operate has also been criticized as placing too much authority in the general public. 
Under social license, corporations now must negotiate directly with members of the community, a “free-
market killing concept” in line with communism in that everything belongs to the people, one observer 
has asserted.93  
 
Despite the criticism, however, there are many who believe social license to operate is a positive 
development. Dwight Newman also writes that: 
  
At a real level, social license to operate has practical effects. At the same time, there are 
important reasons to resist any drift in the concept. So long as it remains a descriptive 
concept for business to be able to analyze factors that include what are ultimately legitimate 
impacts against business, it is a valuable tool for those bold enough to try to create 
prosperity in a sometimes unwelcoming world.94 
 
In addition, many experts recognize the business risks associated with not achieving a social license to 
operate. Some emphasize that only recently have environmental concerns and their associated impact on 
corporate risk for failure to obtain a social license come to light.95 Stakeholders now have the ability to 
impose additional costs on companies or can potentially impact conditions on financing.96 Stakeholders 
can achieve this by organizing boycotts, media campaigns, lobbying governments, or legally challenging 
projects.97 Achieving a social license to operate is imperative because communities have the ability to 
impact a company’s image or reduce its market share.98 Therefore, social license to operate is a critical 
tool in evaluating the risk associated with community opposition to a project and identifying the 
appropriate measures to minimize that risk. 
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The consideration of a social license to operate in the oil and gas industry started in the final years of the 
20th century. It began in the context of oil and gas development taking place primarily in the developing 
world. Still, the issue would not attract a great deal of attention in the developed world until the decade 
beginning in 2010. 
 
 In the late 1990s, social license to operate in the oil and gas industry initially took the form of 
securing what was then referred to as a “license to operate” in addition to any legal or regulatory 
requirements. “By ‘license to operate,’ the companies meant something beyond the production-sharing 
contracts that producers signed with host country governments, or the [engineering, procurement, and 
construction] contracts engineering firms signed to build plants in the country not their own,” Bob 
Tippee, editor of the Oil & Gas Journal, has written.99 “’License to operate’ means not just legal 
permission to perform specific work but social sanction for business activity,” he wrote adding, 
“Judgments about it are rendered not in courts of law, but in the much less well-defined yet often more 
potent court of culture.”100  
 
 However, by 2010, the discussion within the international development industry about the license 
to operate had begun to fade for several reasons. “One easy answer,” Mr. Tippee suggested, was “that the 
concept has been absorbed into a more general emphasis – albeit an important one – on corporate 
responsibility.”101 Moreover, by 2010, many host country governments were keeping the best projects for 
themselves, thus reducing to some extent the role of international oil and gas firms.102 Finally, the anti-
globalization effort, which had blossomed in the late 1990s bringing with it a general antipathy for the 
work of many global companies, had diminished.103 Notwithstanding these developments, Mr. Tippee 
argued that in 2010 “the topic is more important than ever,” stating that transparency was a key element 
in the overall discussion.104 “Priorities such as health, safety, and environmentally sound behavior are 
vitally important and closely linked to the legitimacy of energy work – expatriate or otherwise,” he 
observed.105     
 
 Despite what had taken place in the international oil and gas development context, the matter of 
social license to operate in the developed world did not really begin until the advent of unconventional oil 
and gas development using horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing was introduced and implemented 
in a major way around 2010. The combination of these technologies allowed developers to extract 
resources from shale plays near urban settings. As a consequence, the stage was set for the current debate 
about the industry’s social license to operate in unconventional developments.   
 
The social license to operate “gap” between the mining and oil and gas industries 
                                                            
99 Bob Tippee, “It’s Time for a Fresh Look at the License to Operate,” OIL & GAS JOURNAL, Apr. 26, 2010. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
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In many settings, the mining and oil and gas industries share the appellation of extractive industries.  
“Both industries extract non-renewable mineral resources with consequent issues of resource depletion 
and conservation,” Jim Cooney has said.106 However, there are major differences between how the 
industries operate. “Mines often have long lifespans that stimulate the formation of new or expanded 
communities, which are prone to economic depression during cyclical downturns in commodity 
prices…[In addition] the population explosion around mines poses significant risks to surface and ground 
water,” Mr. Cooney has observed.107 
 
 On the other hand, oil and gas development typically is undertaken in relatively quick steps, 
leading the industry to often assume – or behave as if – it has less need of a long-term relationship with 
the community where the work is being done. One Montana-based activist has explained it this way:  
 
There’s a significant reason why oil and gas companies will never make a serious effort to 
engage with this community the way the [local mine] has. The answer lies primarily in the 
oil and gas cycle… Companies come in for a quick profit. At most they stay a few years, 
and their complicated financial relationships with other companies mean that much of their 
work is subcontracted to others. Their employees come and go, frequently without families, 
often living in temporary housing. The mine, by contrast, is in the community for the long 
term. They have a small number of locations, their employees live in the community and 
send their children to local schools, and as a result the company and its employees have to 
live with the consequences of the way they run their business. It makes sense to work with 
the community as good neighbors.108 
 
As a consequence of how mining is undertaken, as well as public concern and criticism of the impacts of 
mining, the industry “has moved farther than other industries outside its comfort zone to diffuse criticism, 
to find common ground with critics and to change itself,” Mr. Conney has said.109 “[T]he mining industry 
[has] learned matters both of process and of substance: from the engagement process, mining companies 
have learned difficult models of comprehensive dialogue and consensus building with critics. By listening 
to their critics, the companies have learned different approaches to analyzing and managing critical 
issues,” he adds.110 
 Looked at another way, the mining industry understands “that obtaining a formal license to 
operate from governments and meeting regulatory requirements is no longer enough. Instances of mining 
developments being delayed, interrupted, and even shut down due to public opposition have been 
extensively documented.”111 
 
THE NECESSITY OF SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 
 
                                                            
106 Jim Cooney, Sustainable Mining and the Oil Sands, Keynote Speech, at the 2008 Alberta Environment 
Conference (Apr. 23, 2008). 
107 Id. 
108 David J. Katz, American Petroleum Institute ‘Good Neighbor’ Guidelines Sound Nice, But Have Little 
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The absence of social license to operate by an oil and gas firm can be a significant impediment, as it is 
likely to raise important social-political risk in the form of development disruption.112 The impacts of 
such disruption are many, but perhaps the most important is putting profits at risk.113 
 
 There are two concepts that underpin the increasing need for oil and gas companies to acquire and 
maintain a social license to operate. The first involves “observable shifts in governance from State to non-
state actors [that] have given more power to civil society to inform decision-making.”114 The second is 
founded in “people’s concerns [that] have been influenced by the spreading of the sustainability 
paradigm, which emphasizes in particular the importance of preserving…natural capital.”115 
 
 Looked at from an oil and gas company’s perspective, the need for the industry to support 
tougher regulatory requirements – in this specific instance methane regulations – is “all about social 
license to operate.”116 
 
 There is also the matter that in many cases companies will go back to wells that have been 
previously fractured. If the social license was not established the first time, or if established but not 
maintained, then a company (or its successor) may find it is not welcome “the second time around.”  This 
will become increasingly important as operators take advantage of advances in technology to refracture 
existing wells. “Refracturing and recompleting existing horizontal oil and gas wells is becoming more 
prevalent as companies work to make the most of their assets amid pricing uncertainty,” according to FTI 
Consulting, Inc., which works in the oil and gas sector.117  
 
 On the other hand, there are potential weaknesses associated with an industry raising the profile 
of social license in the form of the “failure…to articulate a collaborative developmental agenda for the 
sector.”118 In this regard, “A necessary step in this process is for industry to reconcile its internal risk-
orientation with external expectations and this requires a less defensive and more constructive approach to 
engagement and collaboration.”119      
 
WHAT HAS HAPPENED SO FAR 
 
Despite the efforts of many companies, there remains a deep-seated apprehension among some investor 
groups that the industry’s efforts have not allayed the public’s concerns associated with unconventional 
development, thus putting the social license to operate at risk. For example, one investor group focusing 
on North America has said, “As evidenced by the continuing controversy over allowing shale energy 
development to move forward in Colorado, California, New York, Eastern Canada, and elsewhere, energy 
companies have still not managed to allay public concerns about the risks associated with their operations 
and continue to face potential loss of their social license to operate.”120   
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Still, this same group stated that there were significant opportunities to address this risk stating, 
“We believe companies implementing current best practices in operations and providing thoroughly 
transparent information about these efforts will: enhance the likelihood of securing and maintaining their 
social license to operate; reduce regulatory and reputational risks; reduce liabilities associated with poor 
performance, spills, contamination, and lawsuits; and thereby increase their access to capital.”121 
 
Historic barriers to engagement 
 
Numerous concepts could be pointed to as having been (and continuing to be) historic barriers to 
engagement. Identifying and analyzing them can be helpful in considering how they might be more 
successfully addressed in the future. 
 
 Perhaps the key element that underscores the current barrier of engagement is simply this: the 
historical lack of trust between the industry and its stakeholders. But what exactly is trust? Professor 
Geoffrey Hosking122 from University College London has considered the history of trust. In his words, 
“One of the many difficulties involved in studying trust is that it is several phenomena at once. It is first 
of all a feeling…Trust is also an attitude…Trust is also a relationship, between oneself and another 
person, collective of persons or institution…All three aspects of the world ‘trust’ then…imply a social 
context, and they are all to do with behavior and action or the potential for action.”123  
 
 The corrosive influence of a situation in which lack of trust takes root can be extremely 
damaging. As Professor Hosking has written, “Once unleashed, distrust can spread like a forest fire in 
dry, windy weather…Trust and distrust are part of the deep grammar of any society, the way in which we 
relate to each other, trust or distrust each other, determines much of our social behavior. In order to take 
decisions and act in real life, we need to trust in other people, in institutions, or simply in the future. As an 
Indian policymaker has commented, ‘Confidence grows at the rate a coconut tree grows, and it falls at the 
rate a coconut falls.’”124 
 
 Trust also needs to be understood in the context of identity. “We tend to trust those who most 
resemble us because they are using symbolic systems similar to our own,” according to Professor 
Hosking.125 “Hence we feel a sense of community with them, and to trust them requires little conscious 
efforts.” 
 
 The perceived lack of openness by the oil and gas industry towards its stakeholders underpins this 
lack of trust. This is a crucial barrier since, “The openness of all involved is vital,” as a report about 
hydraulic fracturing by the U.K. House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee, recently 
observed.126 This lack of openness, whether real or perceived, has lead one investor group to assert that 
the industry “has still not managed to allay public concerns about the risks associated with their 
operations and continue to face potential loss of their social license to operate.”127 On the other hand, the 
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lack of trust can be viewed from the industry’s perspective as well. No set of professionals will react 
favorably when it perceives, real or imagined, that it is being attacked for being irresponsible. 
 
 The lack of openness, again real or perceived, finds its way into the matter of whether the public 
thinks adequate information has been made available by the industry. In the absence of this so-called 
“adequate” information, “[T]he public lacks a sufficient basis for evaluating fracking and horizontal 
drilling operations, and is left with only its intuition and the information put forth by third parties.”128 
Relying on third parties who may have their own parochial perspective is not likely to result in a clearer 
picture of the risks and benefits associated with development. 
 
 Associated with the involvement of third parties mentioned above is the problem of polarization.  
The recent report by the U.K. House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee described the 
problem in these words: “Public acceptance…is critical in determining whether fracking should continue 
in the U.K…[B]ut we are unable to see at this stage how the crucial ‘social licence’ can be established 
when the debate around fracking is so polarized.”129 Once polarization is in place, then there is a very real 
chance that the issue quickly becomes politicized and all parties to the underlying issues may lose control 
of the real issues at hand. 
 
 Finally, there is the challenge associated with “post normal” science, a term credited to Professors 
David Ravitz and Silvio Funtowitz.130 Hydrofracturing is an example of a post normal technology, which 
is typified by “excess amount of controversy, dueling fact sheets, or information campaigns, dramatized 
polarities (‘for’ and ‘against’), and deeply entrenched misunderstandings on both sides.”131 In this 
situation, “[E]xperts on both sides [are] embroiled in nasty disagreements about data. In these cases, 
having more information does not always settle public unease about extractive projects.”132 
 
 In numerous respects, the theme of trust – or lack thereof – is associated with many of the barriers 
to engagement. The need to fully address the matter of trust cannot be underestimated since, “When social 
trust breaks down, it tends to reconfigure in a lower-level collective, which then erects rigid boundaries 
around itself.”133   
 
The “social amplification of risk” 
 
The relationship between the deployment of a potentially hazardous technology and the social setting in 
which it will take place can result in establishing an unsubstantiated negative image within the public’s 
collective mind.  
  
 Ian Thomson, who has a long history of working with the natural resources industry, has 
described it this way: “As information about the possible hazard is exchanged, either through word of 
mouth between individuals or through the mass media, internet and social media such as Facebook and 
Twitter, a population may come to perceive the risk of impact as a threat that is many times greater than 
that calculated by informed experts.”134 He refers to this as the “social amplification of risk.” 
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 Mr. Thomson has identified several factors that contribute to the social amplification of risk: 
“[S]election, sensational and/or inaccurate media reporting of risks and regulatory actions to control them; 
the use of technical language; limits in the ability of non-specialists to understand technical information; 
intolerance for scientific uncertainty on the way in which risk is described as an abstract percentage or 
frequency relative to some (seemingly irrelevant) standard; and failure to address the concerns of the 
public directly.”135 The end result, in many instances is that “social amplification is…the precursor to 
stigmatization of a hazard, project or indeed, the industrial activity (fracking) itself.”136 
 
Non-trade association efforts to promote social license 
 
There have been a small number of non-trade association affiliated efforts to promote social license in the 
oil and gas context.  Most of these efforts have involved the Marcellus Formation in the Appalachian 
Basin in the eastern part of the U.S. This may be attributed to the fact that unconventional development 
began at an early stage in Pennsylvania, a state that is politically “more balanced” than states such as 
Texas or Oklahoma where the industry has a faced a more sympathetic reception. 
 
Center for Sustainable Shale Development 
 
The Center for Sustainable Shale Development137 (CSSD) describes itself as “a group of leading 
environmental organizations, philanthropic foundations, and energy companies [that] has collaborated to 
form a unique center to provide producers with certifications of performance standards for shale 
development.”138 CSSD’s overall aim is “to encourage prudent and responsible development of shale gas 
resources in the Appalachian region.”139 
 
 Established in 2013, CSSD is funded by foundations and energy companies operating in the 
Marcellus Shale region. Founding participants included Chevron, the Clean Air Task Force, CONSOL 
Energy, Environmental Defense Fund, Heinz Endowments, Citizens for Pennsylvania’s Future, Shell and 
the Penn Foundation.140   
 
 CSSD received considerable press coverage when it was launched, including a laudatory editorial 
in The Washington Post.141 The Pittsburgh Quarterly, in characterizing several editorials about the CSSD, 
said the coalition was a “long-overdue step toward bridging ideological differences and in addressing the 
environmental safety concerns at the heart of shale gas controversy.”142  
 
 CSSD was announced at the same time a predecessor organization launched 15 initial 
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18 | S o c i a l   L i c e n s e   t o   O p e r a t e :   F r a c t u r i n g   a n d   O i l   &   G a s  
 
Appalachian Basin’s abundant shale gas resources.”143 These standards, which underpin CSSD’s third-
party certification process, are the main focus of CSSD. However, the CSSD also has been involved in 
supporting fracking-related legislation in Ohio, a move that resulted in criticism of the organization.144 
 
 The level of financial support from the oil and gas industry has caused some to suggest “the 
funding balance [has] shifted too heavily to industry members.”145 
 
The Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research 
 
The Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research146 (MCOR), launched in 2013,147 is Penn State 
University’s research and education initiative related to unconventional gas development.  It serves a host 
of stakeholders including industry, environmental groups, landowners, state agencies, and elected 
officials.   
 
 MCOR is “committed to expanding research capabilities on technical aspects of developing this 
resource and to providing science-based programming while protecting the Commonwealth’s water 
resources, forests and transportation infrastructure.”148 
 
MCOR’s activities include:149 
 Researching extraction methods, including alternative fracturing methods and water treatment 
and disposal; 
 Evaluating workforce issues including training and community changes; 
 Publishing reports and presenting programs about changes in land use and landowner decision-
making; and 
 Providing information about legal issues including regulation as well as pipeline siting and tax 
revenues. 
  
MCOR offers a series of short courses for environmental consultants, project planners and engineers, 
economic development officials, water and wastewater treatment managers, and government officials.150   
 
 The university’s College of Agricultural Sciences, College of Earth and Mineral Sciences, Penn 
State Institutes of Energy and the Environment and Penn State Outreach collectively fund the MCOR.151 
However, on at least one occasion it is reported to have used industry funding to offer a “Shale Gas 
Regulators Training Program.”152 
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available at http://news.psu.edu/story/165604/2010/08/18/penn-state-launches-new-education-research-center-
marcellus-shale. 
148 See Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research, supra note 148. 
149 See Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research: What We Do, PENN STATE, 
http://www.marcellus.psu.edu/about/What_we_do.php. 
150 See Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research: Short Courses, PENN STATE 
http://www.marcellus.psu.edu/events/index.php. 
151 See Marcellus Center for Outreach and Research, supra note 148. 
152 Money Draws State Colleges into Marcellus, THE NEWS-ITEM (Shamokin, PA), May 4, 2014. 
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Appalachian Shale Recommended Practices Group 
 
The Appalachian Shale Recommended Practices Group153 (ASRPG,) is a consortium of 11 oil and gas 
producers operating in the Appalachian Basin.  These operators “have come together to identify and 
disseminate responsible standards and practices for effective environmental, health and safety practices 
utilized in shale natural gas and oil development operations in the Appalachian region.”154  Participating 
companies include Anadarko, Chesapeake Energy, Chevron, Shell, WPX Energy and XTO Energy.  
  
 The ASRPG uses a “consensus-based approach to developing the recommended standards and 
practices for Appalachian Shales provides a roadmap to enhance transparency and regulatory complicate, 
as well as empowers workers to stop work that is potentially unsafe, emphasizes the important of 
optimizing local content…”155 
 
 The ASRPG Recommended Standards and Practices,156 which were published in April 2012, 
were developed entirely by the 11 companies. 
   
Center for a Sustainable We2st 
 
The ConocoPhillips Center for a Sustainable We2st157 (CSW) was launched in 2014 at the Colorado 
School of Mines. CSW’s mission is “to promote the joint sustainability of unconventional energy 
production and water resources through education of energy-water literate graduate and undergraduate 
students, and by conducting world-class research on both community acceptance of unconventional 
resource development, and water resources related to unconventional energy production.”158  
  
 Research undertaken by the CSW focuses on community acceptance and water resources 
research.159 An innovative aspect of the CSW is its undergraduate scholars and graduate fellows 
programs.160 
 
 Center director Terri Hogue, associate professor of civil and environmental engineering at Mines, 
said, “Areas of focus for the center include education; community acceptance, communication and 
corporate social responsibility research; and integrated water resources assessment research. The research 
and educational initiatives undertaken at the center will benefit not only unconventional energy producers 
and water-reliant industrial stakeholders, but also the general public.”161 ConocoPhillips provided $3 
million in funding to start the center.162 
                                                            
153 See APPALACHIAN SHALE RECOMMENDED PRACTICES GROUP, http://asrpg.org. 
154 Id.  
155 Consortium of Energy Producers Announce Recommended Standards and Practices for Exploration and 
Production of Natural Gas and Oil from Appalachian Shales, ASRPG (May 1, 2012), 
http://asrpg.org/pdf/ASRPG%20Press%20release.pdf. 
156 ASRPG Recommended Standards and Practices, ASRPG (Apr. 2012), 
http://asrpg.org/pdf/ASRPG_standards_and_practices-April2012.pdf. 
157 We2st stands for Water-Energy Education, Science and Technology.  Mark Harden, ConocoPhillips establishing 
energy-water center at Colorado School of Mines, DENVER BUSINESS JOURNAL ENERGY INC. (Mar. 26, 2014), 
available at http://www.bizjournals.com/denver/blog/earth_to_power/2014/03/conocophillips-establishing-energy-
water-center-at.html?page=all; see CENTER FOR A SUSTAINABLE WE2ST, http://inside.mines.edu/WEST-home. 
158 Id.  
159 See CENTER FOR A SUSTAINABLE WE2ST, http://inside.mines.edu/WEST-research. 
160 See CENTER FOR A SUSTAINABLE WE2ST, http://inside.mines.edu/WEST-undergrads. 
161 Mark Harden, supra note 159. 
162 See News Release, ConocoPhillips Establishes the ConocoPhillips Center for a Sustainable WE2ST at Colorado 
School of Mines, CONOCOPHILLIPS (Mar. 26, 2014), available at  
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The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute 
 
The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute163 (EI) “fosters interdisciplinary interactions among 
colleges and schools across campus, while serving as a portal for external audiences interested in learning 
more about energy research” conducted at the university.164 Although involved in policy issues at a high 
level, the EI does not convene meetings where various stakeholders can move towards consensus 
positions on controversial issues. 
 
 Other areas in which the EI is involved include education, convening energy-related conferences, 
serving as a point of contact for industry, supplying grant money for faculty research, and publishing the 
monthly UT Energy Bulletin,165 and promoting commercialization of energy concepts with industry.166  




Equitable Origin168 is a for-profit169 “social enterprise” with the mission of promoting “best practices and 
continual improvement of responsible upstream oil and gas operations through a set of stakeholder-
negotiated and internationally recognized environmental, social, and good governance standards.”170  
 
 Equitable Origin was co-founded by David Poritz171 and Manuel Pallares, who first met in 
Ecuador, where both were working with communities in the Amazon.172 In early 2009, Equitable Origin, 
which has focused primarily on the Amazon, organized a multi-stakeholder effort that included 
governments, oil and gas companies, indigenous communities, social and environmental NGOs, and 
academics “to create a rating system for social and environmental responsibility in oil and gas exploration 
and production.”173 Out of this effort came the EO™100 Standard, which “consolidates and ensures 





163 See Energy Institute, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, http://energy.utexas.edu/mission/. 
164 Id.  
165 See Energy Institute: UT Energy Bulletin, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, http://energy.utexas.edu/ut-energy-
bulletin/. 
166 Id. 
167 See Energy Institute: Energy Funding Chart, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, 
http://energy.utexas.edu/funding-chart/. 
168 See EQUITABLE ORIGIN, http://www.equitableorigin.com/home/. 
169 Equitable Origin is organized as a for profit venture because its founders concluded that “a for-profit model 
would allow for additional flexibility and ability to scale faster in an industry that is several orders of magnitude 
larger than industries other standard-setting organizations are working in.” See FAQs, EQUITABLE ORIGIN, 
http://www.equitableorigin.com/faq/. 
170 EO100™ Standard, EQUITABLE ORIGIN (February 2012 (A)), http://www.equitableorigin.com/media/eoweb-
media/files_db/EO100_Standard_Shale_Oil_and_Gas_DRAFT_v2.pdf. 
171 For a transcript of a recent video interview with Mr. Poritz, see Oil and Gas: 
Certification System Rates Social and Environmental Responsibility of Production Sites, EETV, Nov. 24, 2014, 
http://www.eenews.net/tv/videos/1902/transcript.  
172 See Helping transform the oil and gas industry one site at a time, EQUITABLE ORIGIN, 
http://www.equitableorigin.com/about-us/overview/. 
173 See Our Story, EQUITABLE ORIGIN, http://www.equitableorigin.com/about-us/our-story/. 
174 Id 
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 Until recently Equitable Origin had focused on onshore conventional oil and gas development.175  
In early 2015, Equitable Origin released a draft of proposed standards, EO100™ Standard Technical 
Addendum EO100.1: Shale Oil and Gas Operations,176 related to hydraulic fracturing in the U.S.177 The 
proposed standards178 cover: 
 Human rights, social impact and community development 
 Fair labor and working condition 
 Indigenous peoples’ right 
 Climate change, biodiversity and environment 
 Project lifecycle management 
 
In announcing the proposed standards, Josh Garrett, a spokesman for Equitable Origin, said, “What we’re 
looking to do is engaged all types of community members and groups that have been affected by shale oil 
and gas development…We want to provide a space for people to get together and discuss the positive and 
negative impacts, view our draft standards, give their input on it and help us develop standards in the 
future that are feasible for the industry and help reduce risk, but also in a comprehensive way address all 
of the concerns that a community may have with new sale oil and gas development coming into their 
area.”179 The company hopes to apply its standards beginning in late 2015.180 
 
Oil and Gas Accountability Project 
 
A group that does not seem focused on social license to operate but should be mentioned is the Oil and 
Gas Accountability Project (OGAP), 181 which is part of Washington, D.C.-based Earthworks.182 It 
describes itself as “the only U.S. environmental nonprofit that focuses exclusively on the destructive 
impacts of resource extraction on community and the environment, in the United States and around the 
world.”183 Earthworks is the group behind the “No Dirty Gold” campaign,184 which includes some 80 
retailers of jewelry who “have committed to cleaning up dirty metals” by sourcing metals more 
responsibly.185 
 
Trade association efforts to promote social license 
 
Several trade associations have actively been involved in addressing social license-related issues. For 
example, in 2014 the American Petroleum Industry (API) published its “Community Engagement 
                                                            
175 See FAQs, EQUITABLE ORIGIN, supra note 169.  
176 See EO100™ Standard Technical Addendum, EQUITABLE ORIGIN, available at 
http://www.equitableorigin.com/media/eoweb-
media/files_db/EO100_Standard_Shale_Oil_and_Gas_DRAFT_v2.pdf. 
177 Organization seeks to create shale development standards in U.S., NATURAL GAS INTELLIGENCE (Mar. 16, 2015), 
available at http://www.naturalgasintel.com/articles/101680-organization-seeks-to-create-shale-development-
standards-in-us. 
178See EO100™ Standard Technical Addendum, supra note 176. 
179 Organization seeks to create shale development standards in U.S., supra note 177. 
180 Id.  
181 See Oil and Gas Accountability Project, EARTHWORKS, 
http://www.earthworksaction.org/reform_governments/oil_gas_accountability_project. 
182 See EARTHWORKS, http://www.earthworksaction.org. 
183 See Media, EARTHWORKS, http://www.earthworksaction.org/media. 
184 Dirty Gold, EARTHWORKS, http://nodirtygold.earthworksaction.org. 
185 80 Jewelry Retailers Sign on to No Dirty Gold Campaign, ECOWATCH (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://ecowatch.com/2012/02/15/80-jewelry-retailers-sign-on-to-no-dirty-gold-campaign/. 
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Guidelines.”186 Moreover, the IPIECA, a global organization that focuses on environmental and social 
issues of the oil and gas industry, established in 2002 a Social Responsibility Working Group, which 
assesses good practices in the context of social responsibility, social impact, and community outreach.187  
IPIECA has also published reports about “Oil and gas industry guidance on voluntary sustainability 
reporting – 2010 update”188 and “A Guide to Social Impact Assessment in the Oil and Gas Industry.”189 






Many ideas have been suggested as concepts involved with obtaining and maintaining a social license to 
operate. This section identifies and analyzes the most effective concepts, which are referred to as 
“guidelines.” The aim of the guidelines is to help oil and gas companies evaluate the risks and benefits of 
implementing a particular guideline or suite of guidelines.     
 
Before beginning, however, it is useful to note that social license is generally “granted on a site-
specific basis,”190 and thus not every concept will be appropriate in every circumstance. But this list, 




Building trust among the developers and all stakeholders is fundamental to establishing the social license 
to operate. The lack of trust is corrosive, often leading to intractable disagreements that offer no 
reasonable ways forward. 
 
But when a crisis of trust does develop, or appears to be developing, “[T]he optimal response 
is…to attempt to broaden the radius of trust by seeking higher-level positive-sum games, reaching across 
boundaries to solve common problem and discover common interest, hoping in the process to create the 
first links of mutual trust, which can then be strengthened.”191 That said, there will always be issues that 
must be treated confidentiality and cannot be disclosed, although deciding what information falls into this 
category can represent “a tricky balance.”192 
 
Finally, a key to building trust is for all parties to recognize that in cultivating “the skills 
necessary to maintain it, we need to recognize the overriding importance of trust in the trustworthy.”193 
 
Emphasizing and implementing early, ongoing communication and engagement 
 
Improve community engagement 
 
                                                            
186 Community Engagement Guidelines, API, ANSI/API Bulletin 100-3, First Ed. (Jul. 2014), available at 
http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Policy/Exploration/100-3_e1.pdf. 
187 Social Responsibility, IPIECA, http://www.ipieca.org/focus-area/social-responsibility. 
188   Oil and gas industry guidance on voluntary sustainability reporting – 2010 update, IPIECA, January 2011, 
http://www.ipieca.org/publication/oil-and-gas-industry-guidance-voluntary-sustainability-reporting-2010-update. 
189 A Guide to Social Impact Assessment in the Oil and Gas Industry, IPIECA, 
http://www.ipieca.org/publication/oil-and-gas-industry-guidance-voluntary-sustainability-reporting-2010-update. 
190 Ian Thomson & Robert G. Boutilier, supra note 50, at 1781. 
191 Geoffrey Hosking, supra note 123, 202. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 203. 
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The need for oil and gas companies to improve community engagement is fundamental to establishing 
and maintaining a social license to operate. However, this comes with a cautionary warning: “This does 
not mean developing more sophisticated public relations campaigns; more spin will not solve the 
problem,”194 according to Professor Jen Schneider,195 an expert on public communication involving 
environmental controversies.” 
 
 Bearing this in mind, improving engagement is particularly important in geographical areas not 
familiar with oil and gas development.  In launching its Community Engagement Guidelines196 in 2014, 
the American Petroleum Institute (API) noted, “[T]he energy revolution is now occurring in areas of the 
country where oil and natural gas exploration doesn’t have the same history as Texas or Oklahoma.”197   
 
 The Community Engagement Guidelines are a “first of its kind standard for community 
engagement,” according to API.198 The Guidelines require, “Oil and gas operators acknowledge the 
challenges associated with industry activities, which can include challenges important to a community.  
Principles of integrity, transparency and consideration for community concerns underpin responsible 
operations.  Conscientious operators are committed to helping communities achieve positive and long-
lasting benefits.  Both local stakeholder and operators can use this guidance...These suggested guidelines 
are typical and reasonable and generally apply under normal operating circumstances.”199 While 
impressive in many respects, the guidelines are just that – the ultimate decision about whether to 
implement them is left up to the individual operator.200  
 
 The Guidelines are still relatively new, but they have already received some criticism. A U.S. 
community group has said that the Guidelines will be ineffective. “The API is a public relations arm for 
the oil and gas industry. They have written a document that has many positive elements, but has little 
chance of being adopted by oil and gas operators, who are much more interested in a hit and run kind of 
approach.”201  Interestingly enough despite this criticism, however, the group went on to compliment the 
API’s efforts:  
 
Throughout the entry phase, which is the one we are in today, the document encourages 
frequent one on one meetings and community forums with local residents to talk about 
things like road safety and traffic, providing communication materials that lay out the 
company plans. They also suggest a way for local citizens to communicate concerns and 
for the company to provide feedback on those concerns in a public way. There are 
suggestions for working with local authorities on workforce development, defining likely 
jobs and ways for residents to prepare for those jobs. The list goes on. The document 
includes many good suggestions that could make a huge difference in how a community 
sees the likely impact of oil and gas drilling.202   
                                                            
194 Jen Schneider, supra note 131.  
195 See Jen Schneider, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY, http://sspa.boisestate.edu/publicpolicy/faculty-and-staff/jen-
schneider/. 
196 Community Engagement Guidelines, supra note 186.  
197 Statement by David Miller, API Director of Standards, API Issues ‘Good Neighbor’ Standards for Oil and 
Natural Gas Developers, API (Jul. 9, 2014), available at http://www.api.org/news-and-
media/news/newsitems/2014/july-2014/api-issues-good-neighbor-standards-for-oil-and-natural-gas-developers. 
198 See David Miller’s Remarks at Press Conference on Community Engagement Standards, (Jul. 9, 2014), available 
at http://www.api.org/news-and-media/testimony-speeches/2014/david-miller-press-conference-on-community-
engagement-standards. 
199 Community Engagement Guidelines, supra note 186. 
200 Id.  
201 David J. Katz, supra note 108. 
202 Id.  
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One activist group does not speak for all groups, obviously, but it does suggest that the API may well 
have opened up a “new front” in the industry’s efforts to engage more effectively and should be 
recognized for such efforts. 
 
 In the eyes of Jim Cooney, who was addressing mining in this comment, “The accountability of 
mines to society requires an on-going process of engagement with local and international stakeholders, 
often through mine oversight or advisory committees, in a form of ‘shared governance.’”203 Whether and 
how “shared governance” should play a role in the oil and gas sector remains to be seen. But Mr. 
Cooney’s remarks come from experience and nearly two decades of observations and therefore deserve 
careful consideration. 
 
 Engagement may even include some type of consultation with the community that is being 
impacted. A major study undertaken by the IIED concluded that “increasingly ‘engagement’ is 
understood to include ‘consultation,’ meaning that the community should be consulted – and on some 
occasions even give its formal or informal consent – about the best way that the company can prevent and 
mitigate its impact before, during, and after the project.”204 The same report defines “meaningful 
consultation” as, “two-way communication in the form of a dialogue and with due regard for linguistic, 
cultural, gender or other barriers, and sensitivity to cultural differences or perceived power imbalances 
between the company and the community.”205  
 
 Looked at from the perspective of Christine Bader, an American who has worked for an 
international oil and gas company, the key is to avoid an aggressive approach in the community where a 
company is operating. “Extractive companies operating overseas have realized that the best approach is 
not an antagonistic one, that you simply can’t throw up a wall, first of all, and try to block out the 
community around you and take a defensive stance, never mind an offensive one,” Ms. Bader,206 a former 
BP executive, has observed.207 
 
 A final observation on the importance of community engagement, and the benefits that may flow 
to a company from undertaking this in a serious and comprehensive manner, is based on a recent study 
conducted about a mining project in Australia. Researchers found that, “When community members 
reported feeling heard, listened to, and that the company would act on their concerns, their trust in the 
company was enhanced. Consequently, the acceptance of the mining operation increased…In the 
literature, it has been suggested that when decision making processes are perceived as being fair, people 
are more accepting of decisions even when the eventual decisions are not in their favour.”208  
  
Establish stakeholder relations manager/department 
                                                            
203 Jim Cooney, supra note 106.  
204 EMMA WILSON AND EMMA BLACKMORE, EDS., INTRODUCTION, DISPUTE OR DIALOGUE?: COMMUNITY 
PERSPECTIVES ON COMPANY-LED GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND 
DEVELOPMENT 20 (2013), available at  http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16529IIED.pdf. 
205 Id. 
206 See CHRISTINE BADER, http://christinebader.com/?gclid=CNHiv_alzMQCFQmDfgodc0gAXQ.  Ms. Bader is 
author of The Evolution of a Corporate Idealist: When Girl Meets Oil, which was published in 2014. 
207 Mark Hand, ‘Corporate Idealist:’ US Shale Companies Could Learn from Overseas Oil Producers, SNL.COM, 
(Mar. 20, 2014), available at https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid=A-27359208-12586.  Ms. Bader 
has also offered this observation about how people in the U.S. might oppose an extractive industries project: “[I]n 
the U.S., people have access to recourse.  People can sue.  People can call up The New York Times.  People can 
tweet.  People can post on Facebook.  People can start campaigns.” Id.  
208 Kieren Moffat & Airong Zhang, supra note 62, at 61, 68.  
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The crucial nature of engagement requires every oil and gas company employee (and subcontractor and 
service provider employee) to consider him or herself invested in the “stakeholder management effort.”  
However, a developer can leverage its engagement efforts even farther by establishing a position of 
“manager of stakeholder relations” (or similar name) responsible for a department committed to the 
effort. 
 
 The manager of stakeholder relations identifies and talks to all key stakeholders well before 
drilling begins, pinpoints key areas where drilling might be appropriate (or not) based on his or her 
engagement with the stakeholders, works with the operations engineers on well siting while bearing in 
mind stakeholder concerns, is available through the drilling and fracturing processes to field calls and to 
meet with stakeholders, and more. Anadarko Petroleum’s Colorado-based efforts have just a position and 
accompanying department.209 Alex Hohmann,210 a professional engineer, is the first person in this newly 
created position. Considered an expert on social license to operate, Mr. Hohmann defines it as “the level 
of acceptance or approval continually granted to an organization’s operation or project(s) by the local 
community and other stakeholders.”211 
 
 According to Mr. Hohmann, engagement is “tantamount to ‘Relationship 101.’”212 As he has 
adeptly noted, “Stakeholder grievances seldom point to ‘hydraulic fracturing’ specifically,” but rather 
subjects such as light, noise, traffic, notification, dust, proximity, duration (intensity) and visual 
impediments.213 
 
 Ideally, the manager of stakeholder relations will be a petroleum engineer with experience in all 
facets of unconventional development. Preferably, the manager of stakeholder relations should report to 
the highest level of operations rather than the communications, public relations, or governmental relations 
department. In this way the manager of stakeholder relations will have access to individuals within 
operations who can stop or order a project change as a result of findings derived from stakeholder 
engagement. 
 
 In Mr. Hohmann’s view, the risk associated with unconventionals going undeveloped is often 
attributable “not for a lack of legal license, but for lack of growing, earning, and maintaining a social 
license.”214 
 
Effectively using social media 
 
Social media has changed the landscape regarding how information is accessed as well as who provides it 
and when. As a result, effectively using social media can represent a “critical success factor for resource 
                                                            
209 Alex Hohmann, Colorado Counties Inc. 2014 Summer Conference, available at, 
http://ccionline.org/download/conference_presentations/CCI%20Foundation%202014%20Summer%20Conference
%20Anadarko%20Petroleum%20Corp..pdf. 
210 For a video presentation by Alex Hohmann, see Alex Hohmann, Social License to Operate: Solving the Human 
Variable, 2014 LANDSCAPE DISCUSSION ON ENERGY LAW & POLICY IN THE ROCKIES, UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING, 
(Oct. 30, 2014), available at  
http://wyocast.uwyo.edu/WyoCast/Play/a90f6978795d436795bf515a2bfde8f61d?catalog=b3edf27d-f1a3-4752-
b149-e95d7c7dd956. 
211 Alex Hohmann, supra note 209. 
212 Stephanie Joyce, supra note 8.  
213 Alex Hohmann, supra note 209. 
214 Stephanie Joyce, supra note 8. 
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development”215 according to energy communications experts at Makovsky Integrated Communications.  
“Companies need to understand that communications is no longer a one-way street – talk with them, not 
to them. With the emergence of social media and digital news, community members, activists, and 
potential customers can all interact with any industry – in real time,” according to Andy Beck, 
Makovsky’s executive vice president.216   
 
 Clearly, social media comes with risks.  For example, companies need to understand that 
technology – i.e., the Internet and social media – enhance “the ability of grass roots opposition to 
mobilize and form coalitions of like-minded others…”217  
 
 But there are significant opportunities as well.  “The speed and ubiquity of digital 
communications both makes [a company’s] reputation more fragile…[but it also] allows corporations and 
their leaders to develop their own channels…without the intermediation of pesky reports,” a columnist for 
the Financial Times has written.218 
 
Specific social media-steps include219: 
 Sharing “compelling content”;  
 Implementing “social listening programs”; 
 Proactively monitoring potential crisis situations; and 
 Increasing social followers. 
 
The effective use of social media can benefit CEOs, who must “visibly engage and communicate both 
inside and outside the organization,” an effort that is considered “extremely important” by Sir Mark 






Increasing transparency about operations associated with unconventional shale gas development is one of 
the keys to developing or maintaining a social license to operate. The Interfaith Center on Corporate 
Responsibility and the Investor Environmental Health Network have suggested, “Companies must be 
publicly transparent about managing their environmental footprint and social impacts, and engage with 
key community stakeholders to earn and maintain their social license to operate.”221 Transparency, in the 
eyes of these two organizations, “requires full disclosure of steps being taken to minimize risks, and 
                                                            
215 Velda Addison, Social Media Could be Key to Social License to Operate, 34 MIDSTREAM MONITOR, HART 
ENERGY 9 (Aug. 25, 2014).  
216 Id. 
217 R.G. Boutilier, L.D. Black, & I. Thomson, supra note 52. 
218 John Lloyd, End the Feud between the Spinners and the Fourth Estate, FINANCIAL TIMES, January 7, 2015.  Mr. 
Lloyd went on to observe, “Leaders of the [public relations] industry both in the US and in Europe see in digital and 
social media not just a route of escape from journalistic tyranny, but also the possibility – rather, the necessity – of 
creating of a more transparent world. They now say that they and their clients must not just profess ethical behavior, 
but demonstrate it.” Id.  
219 Velda Addison, supra note 215.   
220 Sir Mark Moody-Stuart, CEOs must listen and visibly engage, CRITICAL RESOURCE EXECUTIVE BRIEFING, (Jan. 
2013), available at http://www.c-resource.com/q-a-with-sir-mark-moody-stuart-former-chairman-of-shell-anglo-
ceos-must-listen-and-visibly-engage/. 
221 Extracting the Facts: An Investor Guide to Disclosing Risks from Hydraulic Fracturing Operations, INTERFAITH 
CENTER ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND INVESTOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH NETWORK 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/resources_attachments/ExtractingTheFacts121311LR.pdf. 
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acknowledgement of challenges and failures, and clearly defined steps to continually improve 
operations.”222 
 
 A key element of improving transparency needs to include increased quantitative reporting. One 
investor group has said, “[N]arrative reporting – anecdotal reporting of activities in one or two plays – 
and aggregated company-wide reporting of impacts on a national or company-wide level, do not 
sufficiently inform investors about how effectively companies are managing the risks or opportunity 
associated with their operation.  Companies should report data associated with their operational impacts 
using quantitative metrics…in order for investors to be able to rigorously assess company practices.” 223 
 
 The need to divulge environmental performance and community impact reports also “creates a 
powerful incentive to improve such performance, especially from a regulatory standpoint.”224 
 
 Another aspect of the need for more transparency is the requirement in some jurisdictions that 
additional reporting take place.  For example, in 2014 the European Union adopted legislation that will 
require the disclosure in annual reports of large companies’ environmental performance and community 
impacts.225  And in 2012, the Chinese Party Congress “ordered that all major industrial projects complete 
a social risk assessment with slated impact mitigation measures before any project can being.  This move 
was aimed at addressing the increasingly violent environmental protests of the law several years...Zhou 
Shengxian, the Environmental Minister announced that no major projects could be launched without 




Oil and gas operators can demonstrate a greater willingness to be transparent by disclosing the chemicals 
they are using as well as reporting on efforts to reduce fracking fluid toxicity.”227 
 
 A recent investor report indicated that “[M]any companies communicate some kind of intent to 
reduce the toxicity of their fracturing fluids…but very few provide data that would allow investors or 
other stakeholders to evaluate the effectiveness of these initiatives in reducing the toxic chemical 
use…including baseline toxicity, type of toxicity reductions, and percentage of total amount of chemical 
reductions.”228 
  
Notices of violations and fines 
 
No company – oil and gas or otherwise – desires that its mistakes be called to the public’s attention.  
However, taking a lead from the Global Reporting Initiative’s Oil and Gas Section Supplement,229 the 
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“monetary value of significant fines and total number of non-monetary sanctions for non-compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations” should be reported to all stakeholders.230 
 
 As stated by the GRI, “From an economic perspective, ensuring compliance helps to reduce 
financial risks that occur either directly through fines or indirectly through impacts on reputations...The 
strength of the organization’s compliance record can also affect its ability to expand operations or gain 
permits.”231   
  
Management team accountability 
 
In many instances, the types of work that are associated with unconventional development may ultimately 
represent financial risks to shareholders and companies “in the form of fines, regulations, resource 
constraints, or the threat to their social license to operate.”232 Consequently, a corporate-level risk 
management strategy that includes risks associated with environmental performance, health, safety and 
social issues should be established.233  
 
 Increasing disclosure about the company’s environmental, health, safety and social risk 
performance has to be a top level concern. In this regard, “Following the maxim of ‘what gets measured, 
gets managed,’…oil and gas companies [should] increase disclosure about their use of current best 
practices to minimize the environmental and community risks of their fracking activities.”234   
 
 Investors are also going to be interested in a company’s performance on these measures since it 
will allow for a better understanding of how these business risks are being addressed.235 New York State 
Comptroller Thomas P. DiPapoli said in 2014, “The long-term value of our investments in energy 
companies depends on their transparency regarding the steps they’ve taken to manage environmental and 
other risks inherent in the industry.”236 On the other hand, companies that have adopted best management 
practices will be able to differentiate themselves from the laggards.237 
 
 A company’s performance in health, environmental, and safety should be reflected in the 
compensation of executives and managers.238  
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 Moreover, increased emphasis should be placed on a company’s hiring of subcontractors “who 
adhere to the highest standards.”239 Using independent third parties to verify health, safety, and 
environmental performance for potential subcontractors and supplies may be useful in helping establish 
the integrity of the process.240 It may also be useful to include a “social license to operate” provision, 
which sets out responsibilities and expectations, in any agreements with subcontractors. 
 
Identifying key stakeholders 
 
Identifying key stakeholders is fundamental to establishing a social license to operate. Despite the 
importance of this undertaking, however, there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, each situation will 
be slightly different. That said, there are some general principles that may be useful in identifying 
stakeholders.   
 
 The classic definition of a stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organization’s objectives.”241 This has been described as “one of the broadest 
definitions in the literature, for it leaves the notion of stake and the field of possible stakeholders 
unambiguously open to include virtually anyone.”242 
 
 Within the context of stakeholders can be a number of types including, “dormant stakeholders, 
dominant stakeholders, dangerous stakeholders, definitive stakeholders, discretionary stakeholders, 
demanding stakeholders, dependent stakeholders...with varying levels of power, legitimacy and 
urgency.”243 
 
 A complementary approach to identifying and working with stakeholders can be through a 
process called “human geographic mapping,” which depicts “specific bio-social ecosystems and 
[portrays] the attachment people develop to each other and to the land where they live and work.  Social, 
cultural and economic routines along with the geographic features of an area distinguish one population 
or cultural area from another.”244 James A. Kent and Kevin Preister, experts about land use disputes, use 
the mapping procedure along with “social ecology,” which they describe as “a science of community 
based on cultural processes operating in any geographic area.”245 There are two keys to making the social 
ecology effort successful. First, it must be initiated at the very beginning of the project and second “it 
must have parity with the other disciplines in tactical and strategic decision-making.”246 Messrs. Kent and 
Preister acknowledge that this approach takes more time at a project’s beginning, but that the cost and 
time of responding to “community-driven disruptive issues” is reduced in the long run.247    
   
Develop more sophisticated grievance mechanisms 
 
Leading extractive industry companies are beginning to address community-based grievance procedures 
through formal mechanisms that the companies establish.248 Establishing such mechanisms – or channels 
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– is especially important in developing countries where tribunals and courts “can be inefficient, corrupt, 
or reluctant to interfere with extractive industry activities.  This can result in increased conflict and 
resentment among host communities, which may be a key legacy challenge when one company acquires a 
project from another.”249 
 
 A company-community grievance mechanism is a process “for receiving, evaluating and 
addressing grievances from affected communities, in a timely and consistent manner at the site or 
operational level. The mechanism may be wholly or partially run by the company.”250 However, this 
mechanism is not a substitute for a firm’s “community engagement process or vice-versa.  The two are 
complementary and should be mutually reinforcing.”251 
 
Top executives may resist establishment of a grievance mechanism. However there are several 
business reasons for implementation, including “(1) meeting external standards and expectations, (2) 
avoiding escalation of disputes and (costly) conflicts, and (3) learning for better decisions and 
outcomes.”252   
 
“Broaden” decision-making procedures 
 
Whether the industry likes it or not, the public is demanding to have some sort of involvement in 
decision-making.253 At a minimum, the views of stakeholders must have a well-defined way to reach 
corporate decision-makers.254 In addition, cultural aspects of the community must, where appropriate, be 
taken into consideration in terms of decision-making.255 
 
 Appropriately broadening decision-making in the very early stage of a project may help 
overcome a “clash of cultures” between the developer and the local community. The historic approach to 
decision-making has been characterized by designing in isolation from the community, proposing the 
design, and finally defending a decision against opposition.256 In contrast, by involving the community 
early, the community is given “a voice and emotional ownership, which in turns give the company a 
social license to operate. If intentional efforts are made to resolve legitimate citizen issues early in the 
design stage and optimize the local benefits of a project, citizen ownership through absorption will serve 
as a buffer for the project against outside forces.”257 
 
 Another stakeholder group that must be taken into account is investors, and in particular the 
“socially responsible investment movement.”258 In this regard, shareholder resolutions related to 
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Investments Institute (SII).259 This trend has been the result of the shifting of investor advocacy “from a 
moral approach to one that showed the business value of company action,” according to SII.260  
 
Establish community development agreements 
 
Community development agreements are increasingly being used in the natural resources industry “as a 
form of and often legally sanctioned means for registering and securing stakeholder support for particular 
projects.”261 However, it should be borne in mind that, “While agreements provide a tangible basis for 
community engagement and benefit sharing with local communities, fulfillment of agreement conditions 
does not always guarantee what the industry regards as a ‘social licence.’”262  
 
Establish environmental agreements 
Increasingly, environmental agreements (EA) are being used in the mining industry, with at least 120 
being used in Canada alone.263 These agreements are “particular to specific…projects and exist alongside 
the multiple voluntary international standards that seek to codify best business practices and asses firms’ 
[corporate social responsibility] performance.”264 An EA is “supra regulatory…in the sense that it exists 
alongside formal processes like environmental impact assessment but is not itself prescribed in 
regulation.”265 
 
Expand environmental health research to integrate community perspectives 
 
Community-based participatory research (CBPR) should be considered where there are community 
perceptions of health stressors or impacts related to unconventional development.266 “CBPR provides a 
framework for engaging community members in research and has been effectively applied to a number of 
environmental health problems. CBPR goes beyond just sharing research results with community 
members to creating meaningful opportunities for community participation in all stages of research (i.e., 
project scoping, data collection, analysis and dissemination). CBPR principles should be embraced in 
designing and conducting studies on environmental and health impacts of unconventional natural gas 
drilling operations so that a range of community perspectives are addressed.”267  
 
 The process of involving all stakeholders (e.g., individuals, communities, advocacy groups, 
industry, decision-makers) “fosters multi-directional communication and accountability” and should be 
engaged in early on.268 
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 Under the CBRP process, study results are disseminated to communities in a timely manner.269  
As such, a “Community First Communication Model,” which shares research findings with the affected 
community before publishing them in scientific literature as a way to empower the community by 
reducing information disparities, is recommended. Communities should be engaged in determining the 
most effective ways to disseminate research findings and there should be timely and transparent 
dissemination and access to aggregated data.”270     
 
Expand social investment 
Social investment, as defined by the IPIECA, represents “voluntary contributions companies make to the 
communities and broader societies where they operate, with the objective of benefiting external 
stakeholders, typically through the transfer of skills or resources.”271 
 
 The IPIECA and the Society of Professional Engineers have recently combined efforts to raise the 
profile of social investment by oil and gas firms. “Over recent years, energy companies have worked to 
expand traditional philosophy into approaches that more explicitly address risk management, social 
license, and shared value objectives,” the IPIECA and SPE have said. In 2014 they sponsored a webinar 
to “explore this evolution as well as discuss some of the major success factors and challenges associated 
with determining social investment priorities, managing design and implementation requirements, 
assessing social investment performance, and reporting on impacts.”272    
 
 It is worth noting that social investment is different from community engagement.  According to 
IPIECA, “Community engagement focuses on maintaining positive relations between the company and its 
local stakeholders on a day-to-day level, whereas social investment aims to have a positive impact on the 
sustained well-being of stakeholders. They require different, but complementary, strategies and 
approaches.”273 
 
 Finally, IPIECA provides cautionary advice about who provides the social investment program: 
“[If] a company engages with a community only through [a social investment] program implemented by a 
partner, and lacks having a ‘face’ in the community, it invites the risk that any credit will go to the 
implementing partner, while blame will still come back to the company.”274 
 
 Corporate philanthropy expert Bruce DeBoskey has advised that “Successful companies now 
recognize that philanthropy is a key component of corporate citizenship and business strategy. Too often, 
corporate philanthropy is random and uncoordinated. To be truly effective, it must be strategic.”275 
 
Improve water stewardship 
 
The process of hydraulic fracturing entails the use of large quantities of water. In addition, one of the 
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water pollution. However, the amount of water used “can be less important than how stakeholders 
perceive [a company’s] withdrawal and consumption patterns.”276 
 
 Consequently, a key element in the effort to establish and maintain a social license to operate 
involves water stewardship. “Most companies realize that much of their social license to operate hinges 
on their prudent management of water in terms of both quality and quanity,” a leading non-governmental 
organization has suggested.277 Moreover, “By getting ahead of the curve on water stewardship, the oil and 
gas industry has an opportunity to avoid conflicts over water usage before they become acute as well as to 
improve its image as a whole,” according to a Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions study.278 
 
 Water stewardship programs should take into consideration three water-related risks: regulatory, 
physical, and reputational (which is based on stakeholder perceptions about a company’s pattern of 
withdrawals and consumption).279According to the Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions the programs, 
which should span the entire company, will “often consider how water competition could affect business 
operations, brand value, and the social license to operate, along with analyzing the potential implications 
of upstream and downstream activities upon water quality, withdrawal and consumption.”280 
 
 Overall use of water should be reduced and wherever possible, recycled water should be used 
while bearing in mind any associated increased risks associated with storage and or transport.281 
 
 There are related reporting practices that should be considered. For example, in addition to 
increasing water monitoring the reporting on water quality monitoring practices should be undertaken.282  
Furthermore, as the use of water is more closely managed and efficiency increased, the metrics on 
improved efficiency should be provided to all interested stakeholders.283 Industry may also want to 
consider supporting efforts such as Colorado Water Watch (CWW),284 which is “a real-time groundwater 
monitoring pilot project” developed by Colorado State University and the Center for Energy and Water 
Sustainability. CWW includes a network of sensors “capable of detecting changes in groundwater quality 
due to natural or operation impacts. The data is monitored, gathered, analyzed and reported by CWW and 
posted to [a] website to provide information to communities in the [Denver Julesburg] Basin.”285 
 
 Discharging processed water or effluents to treatment facilities “not only reduces pollution, but 
can also lower the organization’s financial costs and the risk of regulatory action for non-
compliance…All of this enhances the …organization’s social license to operate.”286 
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 Finally, the adoption of well integrity practices should be of paramount concern so as to ensure 
the adequacy of casing and cement.287 
 
Improved “risk communication” and managing “outrage”  
 
It has been suggested “When it comes to communicating environmental risk, business needs to recognize 
that outrage is as important as hazard.”288 Acknowledging “outrage” is fundamental to improving risk 
communication, according to Peter Sandman, the leading U.S. expert on environmental risk 
communication and managing public outrage.289 According to Mr. Sandman, “When people are outraged, 
they tend to think the hazard is more serious that it is…Trying to convince them that it’s not is unlikely to 
do much good until you reduce the outrage.”290 
 
 Mr. Sandman, who has also been called a “crisis communications expert,”291 has given 
considerable thought to the challenges companies face when communicating about fracking, particularly 
the relationship between some of the public’s outrage, on the one hand, with the real nature of the hazard 
it may present on the other. He begins by placing considerable weight on how the underlying issues are 
“framed.” 
 
 “[F]raming the controversy – economic pluses versus environmental minuses – is arguably part of 
the risk communication problem. That’s certainly the way most fracking proponents and opponents see 
the controversy, and the way most media stories report it: as a classic jobs-versus-environment battle,” 
Mr. Sandman has said.292 In contrast, he argues that people need to acknowledge that there are pluses and 
minuses on both sides of the equation, a development that “would force us all to grapple with the 
tradeoffs.”293  
 
 Framing, according to Mr. Sandman, who founded the Environmental Communication Research 
Department at Rutgers University in the U.S. state of New Jersey, is a “universal psychological 
phenomenon…It is characteristic of nearly all risk-versus-benefit controversies. Once people decide a 
technology is unacceptably risky, they tend to ignore or disparage its benefits, rather than regretting that 
the risks make those benefits sadly unattainable. Similarly, once people decide a technology is too good to 
pass up, they tend to ignore or disparage its risks, rather than claiming that the risks are real but the 
benefits make those risks worth taking.”294 
 
 Bearing this challenge in mind, Mr. Sandman has compiled a list of recommendations for how 
companies can address the risk communication challenges related to fracking:295 
 Before work begins, offer well water testing. 
 Quit referring to “education” as if it is the only impediment between a person’s acceptance of the 
process.  “Few things are more guaranteed to arouse stakeholders’ outrage than telling them that 
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they’re ignorant and would be on your side for sure if they just understood the facts.  Fracking 
industry spokespeople…need to learn that the fracking debate is about values at least as much as 
facts.” 
 Early attention should be given to individual complaints. 
 “Take a stand against corporate bad actors…It’s probably too much to expect for a fracking 
company to blow the whistle on another fracking company…But after others have identified the 
bad actors, is it too much to expect for the rest of the industry to take the information onboard?” 
 Avoid development in locations that are special to a community.  “[P]utting a drilling pad near a 
grade school is courting outrage.  So is putting a drill pad near a much-loved park, or putting one 
where it will ruin a cherished viewscape.” 
 “Acknowledge the history of fracking misbehavior…A company or industry that expects to be 
forgiven for what it has done in the past must own up to it first – not just once but often; not just 
factually but with visible contrition; not just when your critics raise the issue, but proactively, 
raising it yourself until your critics are sick of hearing about it.” 
 
The cost of implementing these recommendations might increase the business costs, Mr. Sandman 
admits. “But at least in the developed world, the cost of outrage is now higher than the cost of outrage 
management. An industry that can’t afford to ameliorate stakeholders’ outrage without going out of 
business is going to go out of business anyway,” he argues.296 “However belatedly, the industry is coming 
to realize that anti-fracking stakeholder outrage poses an existential threat. Figuring out how best to 
ameliorate that threat should be – and I think will be – a top industry priority for the foreseeable future.  
The industry can’t succeed without improved environmental performance. But it can’t succeed without 
improved risk communication either,” he suggests.297 
 
Become a “social purpose leader” 
 
Taking a leadership role on an important social issue – i.e., becoming a “social purpose leader” – may 
broadly help a firm establish and/or maintain a social license to operate.298 The Canadian and Latin 
American-based firm Impakt helps companies identify a social purpose. Impakt recommends 
development of a statement of corporate social purpose in the form of “an articulation of the corporation’s 
social purpose that captures what the company stands for, what social issue is most aligned with who the 
company is and what it does and how social initiatives will contribute to measurable business objectives 
and meaningful social change.”299 This statement can function as “a key strategic and communications 
asset that helps to establish program priorities and to support communications,” Impakt says. 
 
Acknowledge climate change and efforts to address it 
 
Acknowledging that climate change is taking place, and the need to take action to address the change, can 
help the gas industry build trust among its many stakeholders.300 In this regard, Shell has been “increasing 
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 As a part of this effort, companies can highlight that the increased usage of gas to power 
electricity generation has two fundamental benefits. First, it reduces the total amount of carbon released 
as gas begins to displace coal-fired electricity generation.302 And second, “Natural gas can be dispatched 
flexibly. The quick ramping ability of natural gas generators makes them ideal for complementing 
variable renewable generation.”303  
 
 A final observation about climate change involves the notion that if oil and gas companies are, in 
the final analysis, involved in the energy business, then it may make sense to hedge some percentage of a 
firm’s assets by investing in renewable energy. On the one hand, this will demonstrate climate change 
sensitivity to stakeholders concerned about the issue while on the other hand reassuring investor groups 
that the company is positioning itself to deal with a more carbon-constrained world.304 
 
Measuring social license to operate efforts 
 
Measuring success, or lack thereof, in relation to social license to operate efforts is not an easy task.  A 
group of Australian researchers has said, “The social licence to operate is inherently difficult to 
quantify.”305 However, considerable benefit can be achieved by a company that can evaluate the social 
license issues and assess the efforts that may be required to reduce any socio-political risk “to an 
acceptable level.”306 
 
 While efforts to measure social license to operate are new, there are indications that it can be 
done with the appropriate expertise. Kieren Moffat, senior fellow at the Centre for Social Responsibility 
in Mining at the University of Queensland307 and colleague Airong Zhang have recently written (in the 
context of the mining industry) that social license “can be quantitatively measured and modeled using 
sophisticated social science methods and analytical techniques. This allows for consistent and robust 
benchmarking of social performance across time as an operation develops.”308   
 
 At least one research project has identified questions that may be useful in trying to measure 




Among other ideas, which should all be part of a Social License to Operate Report, to bear in mind in 
relation to social license to operate: 
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305 Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, supra note 40, at 121. 
306 Id. at 122. 
307 See Kieren Moffat, THE UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND, AUSTRALIA, https://www.csrm.uq.edu.au/people/kieren-
moffat. 
308 Kieren Moffat & Airong Zhang, supra note 62, at 69. 
309 Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, supra note 40, at 125. 
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 Paying above the minimum “can be one factor in building strong community relations, employee 
loyalty, and strengthening an organization’s social license to operate. This [becomes] most 
relevant for organizations in which a substantial portion of their workforce is compensated in a 
manner or scale that is closely linked to laws or regulations on minimum wages.”310  
 Sourcing from local suppliers will demonstrate “positive local economic impacts. Local sourcing 
can be a strategy to help ensure supply, [support] a stable local economy…The proportion of 
local spending can also be an important factor in contributing to the local economy and 
maintaining community relations.”311 
 Providing training, education, and counseling to workers and members of the community about 
serious disease particularly where work is taking place in areas with a greater communicable 
disease incidence. In this regard, “Preventing serious diseases contributes to the health, 
satisfaction, and stability of the workforce, and helps maintain the organization’s social license to 
operate in a community or region.”312 
 Investing in renewable energy companies and projects, and using renewable energy where 
possible in operations.313   
 
 




What is often missing from the discussion about social license to operate in the oil and gas industry’s 
unconventional development work is an entity or institution that can convene all parties to a dispute. In 
the absence of such a body, the various sides to the dispute typically line up on opposite sides and then 
the skirmish ensues in the middle. The result is all too often underscored by bitterness, contention, and 
polarization. In many such instances, no party really wins. Moreover, what is left is a legacy of distrust 
combined with bitterness. But it does not necessarily have to be this way, particularly if companies and 
their stakeholders have somewhere else to go to consider and ultimately reconcile their differences. 
 
 Looking back at the history of the international mining community in the 1990s, the 
establishment of the Minerals, Mining, and Sustainable Development (MMSD) effort, and the subsequent 
launching of the International Council on Mining and Metals314 provide context in which to consider 
where today’s unconventional developers find themselves. Of course the mining and metals industry is 
not identical to the unconventional oil and gas development industry, but there are lessons from the 
mining industry that may be useful. Jim Cooney provides greater context in this regard. Referring to the 
MMSD effort as well as a Canadian-based Whitehorse Mining Initiative,315 Mr. Cooney has said, “These 
two initiatives propelled the mining industry forward towards a new way of doing business, of relating to 
critics, of engaging with stakeholders, and of understanding the role and responsibility of mining.”316 A 
group of leading companies had “decided to move out of their defensive posture and engage their critics 
in a comprehensive dialogue in search of common good,” he says.317   
                                                            
310 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines & Oil and Gas Sector Supplement, supra note 231, at 11.   
311 Id. at 12. 
312 Id. at 14. 
313 From a business perspective, a fossil fuel-based company may want to hedge it bets as well as provide investors 
clear evidence that they are taking action to “remain sustainable and profitable in the future amid stricter 
government policies on climate change.”  Andrea Vittorio, supra note 304.  
314 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING & METALS, http://www.icmm.com/members. 
315 See WHITEHORSE MINING INITIATIVE, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-materials/policy/government-canada/8698. 
316 Jim Cooney, supra note 106. 
317 Id.  
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 While the parallels are not exact, this is clearly a time that the unconventional oil and gas 
development industry – and their stakeholders as well – must consider a paradigm shift just as the 
international mining industry did around 2000. It will, of course, not be without much questioning and 
even derision from those who are wedded to the past. But an alternative to today’s approach must be 
conceived by respected and open-minded individuals and organizations. 
 
THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL LICENSE TO OPERATE IN THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY  
 
What is envisioned is the establishment of a new entity (or set of entities as the case may be) that will 
have as its mission to launch an organization to serve as a neutral venue where all parties can gather to 
explore their points of view, including those on which they agree as well as disagree. The Center for 
Social License to Operate in the Oil & Gas Industry (the Center) will provide a safe and inclusive place to 
gather on an on-going basis.   
 
 The Center will preferably bring (or develop over six to 12 months) these attributes: 
 Located within a research university of indisputable integrity. 
 Have links to research universities in the area (e.g., the region or state) that focus on all of the 
many disciplines involved with unconventional development near people, including business, 
engineering, environmental science, law, health and so on. 
 Be headed by an individual of great distinction both in an academic and business sense. 
 Be advised by a board of directors318 that reflects the wide range of stakeholders interested in this 
subject, including, but not limited to businesses, communities, economic developers, 
environmental groups, health and safety professionals, and oil and gas representatives. 
 Have initial funding provided by foundations or other organization that are not connected to the 
oil and gas industry. 
 
The Center’s work will, among other things, consist of:  
 Gathering the stakeholders together on a regular basis. 
 Helping the stakeholders identify shared goals, as a beginning step. 
 Publishing, where appropriate, stakeholder-agreed guidelines for social license to operate best 
practices. 
 Sponsoring community seminars where the work of the Center can be explained and ideas 
solicited. 
 Working with educational institutions on preparing curricula for key types of professionals (e.g., 
business people, conveners, engineers, lawyers) that will integrate best practice thinking into the 
various disciplines as well as encourage cross-disciplinary teaching as a way to “break down 
walls” between the various key professionals. 
 Working with the media to provide more context to coverage of the underlying issues. 
 
The Center’s work plan 
 
The Center’s work plan will include the following:  
 Convening stakeholders319 who pledge a “good faith effort” to work to form consensus-based 
SLO guidelines. 
                                                            
318 It would be preferable that members of the board not see their role as to simply represent the narrow interests of 
their own group, but rather agree to work for “the good of the whole.” 
319 In the context of the MMSD project, the Scoping Report said a critical aspect of the project would be to achieve 
key stakeholders’ early involvement and establishing a work approach focused on building a partnership.  Having 
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 Initially conducting a “scoping exercise” with a small group of stakeholders to establish the 
process for collaboration. 
 Undertaking dialogue that includes pinpointing the key issues, considering aspects of agreement 
and disagreement about the key issues, agreeing to continue to talk on an on-going basis. 
 Working towards consensus agreements on planning and operating guidelines 
 Establishing an auditing system against which company (voluntary) performance can be judged. 
 Certifying auditors. 
 Publishing audit reports freely available to all. 
 
Developing knowledge in a “shared” environment 
 
A key element of the Center’s function will be commissioning independent research on current and future 
issues that are critical to building consensus decisions and community trust. Among the initial research 
projects might be:   
 
Analyzing local community benefits and costs 
 
An important step in achieving sustainability and the social acceptance of communities where 
development takes place involves how to “maximize the net benefits.”320 This is particularly the case for 
what can be called “boom town” communities, which flourish when development is taking place but 
suffer when it slows or disappears.321 
 
 In this regard, better understanding the environmental risks associated with unconventional 
development will need continuing attention. “Because the scale of shale gas development has increased so 
quickly, the research community is playing catch-up in terms of understanding how large the 
environmental risks of…development might be,” according to Resources for the Future.322 Among the 
important sub-issues to be studied include: 
 How significant are water quantity and water quality risks? What are the best options to manage 
these risks, particularly in areas of water scarcity?323 
 What is the frequency and extent of impacts to groundwater?324 
 What is the impact of “habitat fragmentation” associated with unconventional development?325 
 How can biodiversity and habitat impacts be lessened?326 
 
                                                            
stakeholders “inside the project” would be critical “to better [defining] the issues at stake, [and] also to [ensuring] 
that the results have credibility and weight.”  Luke Danielson, Architecture for Change: An Account of the Mining, 
Minerals and Sustainable Development Project - History, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE 43 (2006). 
320 Alan J. Krupnick, Managing the Risks of Shale Gas: Key Findings and Further Research, RESOURCES FOR THE 
FUTURE 1 (June 2013), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-rpt-managingrisksofshalegas-
keyfindings.pdf. 
321 Id. 
322 Alan J. Krupnick, et.al., The National Gas Revolution: Critical Questions for a Sustainable Energy Future, 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 19 (Mar. 2014), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-Rpt-
NaturalGasRevolution.pdf. 
323 Alan J. Krupnick, et.al., The National Gas Revolution, supra note 324, at 19. 
324 Id. at 20. 
325 Id. 
326 Id. Reputational damage may result if there is a “failure to adequately manage such impacts” and this may 
contribute to a loss of social license to operate. Sustainability Reporting Guidelines & Oil and Gas Sector 
Supplement, supra note 231, at 19.   
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Meanwhile, the social impact of a company’s activities also needs more study. It has been noted that in 
the mining context economic and environmental impacts have been closely monitored, but not so for 
social impacts.327 This is quite likely the case for unconventional development as well, and should be 
addressed by the Center. 
 
Understanding public health impacts 
 
To date, the identification and tracking of health impacts has generally been limited due to a lack of 
data.328 However, “Health impacts and stressors are perceived to exist in communities with 
unconventional natural gas drilling operations. Given that elements of a property owner’s control may 
cease once [drilling] begins, these perceptions are consistent with an involuntary risk model, based on a 
lack of control of an unknown hazard with little opportunity for independent verification of safety.”329 
 
 Consequently, to what degree has public health, including physical and mental, been impacted by 
unconventional development?330 Health researchers have increasingly noted “that having a better 
understanding of the relationship between energy development and health outcomes, including social 
support, life satisfaction, and mental health issues…is critical to developing and implementing 
intervention programs design to prevent and/or treat negative health outcomes.”331 
 
Evaluating seismic activity 
 
Seismic impacts have received considerable media attention,332 but more research needs to be undertaken.  
“Felt seismicity induced by hydraulic fracturing is very rare,”333 according to a recent article in the 
Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America. Moreover, a leading think-tank has said, “[T]he 
academic literature strongly leans towards the view that seismic impacts from fracking per se are trivial.  
[However], impacts from liquid waste injection into Class II wells are of greater concern.”334  
 
 With those ideas in mind, what is the relationship between fracking operations, including water 
disposal, and seismic activity? If a relationship is established, what strategies are available to mitigate the 
impact? 
 
Analyzing the loss of public trust 
 
                                                            
327 Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, supra note 40, at 43. 
328 Trevor M. Penning, et. al., Environmental Health Research Recommendations from the Inter-Environmental 
Health Sciences Core Center Working Group on Unconventional Natural Gas Drilling Operations, ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSPECTIVES 13-14 (Jul. 18, 2014), available at http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/wp-
content/uploads/advpub/2014/7/ehp.1408207.pdf.  
329 Id.  
330 Alan J. Krupnick, et.al., The National Gas Revolution, supra note 324, at 21. 
331 Jeffrey B. Jacquet, Review of Risks to Communities from Shale Energy Development, 48 ENVTL. SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY 8321, 8328 (2014). 
332 Max Ehrenfreund, Massive spike in Oklahoma earthquakes may be due to fracking, THE WASHINGTON POST 
WONKBLOG, (Jan. 7, 2015), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/06/wonkbook-massive-spike-in-okla-earthquakes-
may-be-due-to-fracking/. 
333 Robert J. Skoumal, Michael R. Brudzinski, & Brian S. Currie, Earthquakes Induced by Hydraulic Fracturing in 
Poland Township, Ohio, 105 BULLETIN OF THE SEISMOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA 189 (Feb. 2015). 
334 Alan J. Krupnick, et.al., The National Gas Revolution, supra note 324, at 22. 
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A major stumbling block to unconventional development is often attributable to the lack of trust the 
public holds in the institutional foundations of government and the oil and gas industry.335 Professor 
Jeffrey B. Jacquet, an expert on the sociology of rural development, has written, “Trust…is becoming of 
increasing importance in shale gas communities, as new research shows that decreased trust in governing 
bodies and officials correlates strongly with increased perception of risks, increased stress, and increased 
reportage of physical and mental health problems.”336 
 
Thus, the underlying questions: How pervasive is the loss? Can it be re-established? If so, how? 
 
Tracking and evaluating public response 
 
Tracking the public’s response to the development of unconventional energy is important. What does 
longitudinal research337 indicate regarding public response? Does it change over time and through various 
market cycles? To make such research of more use to environmental and rural sociologists, in addition to 
policy makers, “it must also be situated within the study of other sociological phenomena such as natural 
resource conflicts, ecological modernization, risk perspective, the treadmill of production [and] 
technological disasters.”338 
 
Measuring social license to operate 
 
Measurement protocols for social license to operate in the oil and gas industry need further attention, 
including how they can be fine-tuned for use at different local and regional levels. Of particular 
importance is developing sophisticated (but flexible) schemes to better ascertain “perceptions of 
economic legitimacy and social legitimacy.”339 
 
                                                            
335 Id. at 23. 
336 Jeffrey B. Jacquet, supra note 333, at 8324. 
337 Longitudinal research involves collecting and analyzing data over a period of time.  This research method is 
essential in the measurement of social change. Social Research Update – Longitudinal Research in the Social 
Sciences, UNIVERSITY OF SURREY, ENGLAND, http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU28.html. 
338 Anthony E. Ladd, Stakeholder Perceptions of Socioenvironmental Impacts From Unconventional Natural Gas 
Development and Hydraulic Fracturing in the Haynesville Shale, 28 JOURNAL OF RURAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 56, 83 
(2013). 
339 Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers, & Michael Burton, supra note 40, at 127. The authors of this report went on to 
write, “In this study we develop measures of SLO for the oil and gas industry in Western Australia.  The approach is 
novel in that it aims to identify the SLO held by communities that may be geographically distant from the 
operational site, rather than local communities, something that has not previously been investigated.  We identify 
two measures of SLO, that related to perceptions of economic legitimacy and social legitimacy.…[W]e find it rare 
for an individual to hold a higher value for social legitimacy than economic legitimacy, i.e., economic legitimacy is 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for social legitimacy.  The scores for economic legitimacy indicate that the 
population on average believes that [the oil and gas] industry provides the State with economic benefits.  This aligns 
with the observation...that in the West Australian context the process of gaining a SLO has been largely limited to 
one of economic legitimacy.  However, they are more ambivalent in their judgment of whether oil and gas 
companies contribute to their wellbeing, share their values, and are generally trustworthy.  As a result, oil and gas 
projects are likely to be accepted, but not to receive a binding SLO…[T]hese initial results do suggest that the 
approach used would have value in any jurisdiction where there are concerns about the impacts of industry within 
the broader civil society, and not just local populations who may have direct interactions with industry.” Id. 
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As the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation has asserted, 
“Measuring and modeling social licence….shows industry where to invest to develop genuine, trust based 
relationships with community stakeholders.”340 
 
Auditing systems to confirm company performance against SLO guidelines, thus leading to certification 
 
For the public to develop trust in a company’s performance against SLO guidelines, a fair and transparent 
auditing scheme must be established. In this regard, Resolve,341 a Washington, D.C.-based independent 
nonprofit organization, has written,  
 
A concerted research effort is needed to bridge significant gaps in knowledge about the 
impacts of standards and certification systems and the conduct under which they are more 
or less effective...This effort could include filling gaps in knowledge about the baseline 
status of relevant socio-cultural or ecological systems, as well as linking into research on 
the relationships between prescribed management practices and outcomes.342   
 
That said, certification systems “remain limited in their ability to compel compliance in the same way as 
regulations enforceable by law. Governments continue to play a critical role not only in creating and 
enabling environment for certification but in complementing standards with regulations and other 
measures that ensure minimum acceptable performance.”343  
 
In rural settings 
 
While a considerable amount of unconventional development is taking place in more urban and suburban 
settings than ever before, there continues to be development in rural settings. Dr. Tom Measham,344 an 
Australian-based expert on the sustainability of rural communities, has noted, “One substantial economic 
change which has developed over the past decade, and which has significant impacts for rural areas with a 
history of agriculture, is a new industry in the form of unconventional natural gas.”345 In this regard, he 
has said, “Unconventional gas posed different impacts on rural communities compared with other forms 
of resource extraction. In particular, the imprint of unconventional gas is extensive rather than 
intensive…This has the effect of thrusting different and potentially competing industries together in the 
same parcel of land. This can generate new types of conflicts, and potential benefits.”346   
 
 Consequently, unconventional development in rural areas needs to be studied bearing in mind the 
different types of issues that might well be important in a rural setting (e.g., how to address the 
demographic phenomenon of large numbers of young men being concentrated in the development area347 
                                                            
340 See Social Licence to Operate, COMMONWEALTH SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH ORGANISATION 
(CISRO), http://www.csiro.au/Organisation-Structure/Flagships/Minerals-Down-Under-Flagship/mineral-
futures/Project-Social-licence.aspx. 
341 See RESOLVE, http://www.resolv.org/. 
342 Executive Summary - Toward Sustainability: The Roles and Limitations of Certification, THE STEERING 
COMMITTEE OF THE STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION ES-17 (June 2012), 
available at http://www.resolv.org/site-assessment/files/2012/06/Toward-Sustainability-Executive-Summary.pdf. 
343 Id. at ES-13. 
344 See CSIRO, http://people.csiro.au/M/T/Tom-Measham.aspx. 
345 Thomas G. Measham & David A. Fleming, Impacts of Unconventional Gas Development on Rural Community 
Decline, 36 JOURNAL OF RURAL STUDIES 376 (2014). 
346 Id. at 378. 
347 This situation “has been historically linked to particular types of social impacts such as alcoholism, sexually 
transmitted diseases and violence, with the effect of discouraging young women from staying in the affected 
communities and contributing to underlying rural decline.”  Id. at 379. 
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and how unconventional gas development influences “the three core components of rural decline, namely 
rural out-migration, education attainment, and poverty reduction”348). 
 
What is the impact of media coverage on public perception? 
 
An informed media can provide better and more complete coverage of issues. That said, today’s media 
coverage of unconventional development needs to be improved if the larger audience of readers is going 
to understand what is going on. Research needs to be undertaken on how the media covers the issue and 
what impact that has on public perception. This project should likely be undertaken in conjunction with a 
well-respected school of journalism or media communications. 
 
The transfer and/or capture of wealth 
 
More research needs to be undertaken about the impact of shale development on both community and 
individual wealth. The primary question to be considered is “the degree to and ways in which royalties to 
landowners can serve to mitigate the long-term community-level problems” associated with boomtowns 
and the resource curse.349 For example, “What happens…when farmer-landowners receive mineral 
wealth?  Are they more likely to invest in farm operations or consumer spending? To stay on the land or 
move elsewhere?”350  
 
 Consideration of this set of questions might inform initiatives focused on “capturing the wealth at 
the local level,” if that was so desired.351 
 
Understanding the impacts of community-level stigma and how to address it 
 
Communities where shale gas development is taking place may be stigmatized as a result of the 
perception of environmental contamination.352 The concept of stigma involves “labeling and 
categorization…based on perceived negative and disgraceful attributes.”353   
 
 As a consequence, there are several questions that need further study: 
 To what degree might a community be stigmatized by shale development? 
 Will communities where shale development is taking place experience “adverse effects on 
population growth and investment?”354 
 In the event of occurrence of adverse effects, “will it primarily affect certain types of 
investment, such as amenity-led development?”355 
 “Are shale energy contaminants likely to lead to ‘brownfield’-type remediation and associated 
challenges, or will the actual and perceived contamination…result in [a] novel kind of 
remediation context?”356 
 
How can a positive SLO be taken account of in an M&A context 
 
                                                            
348 Id. at 382. 
349 Jeffrey B. Jacquet, supra note 333, at 8327. 
350 Id. 
351 Id. 
352 Id. at 8326. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. at 8328. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. 
44 | S o c i a l   L i c e n s e   t o   O p e r a t e :   F r a c t u r i n g   a n d   O i l   &   G a s  
 
Mergers and acquisitions attorneys have long understood the importance of factoring in “political risk” in 
situations where major oil companies purchase assets from exploration firms. To the extent that political 
risk also embodies social license to operate, this suggests “that the absence of social license is already 
integrated to some extent into the process.”357 On the other hand, the value of having a social license to 
operate in place has not attracted as much attention. Consequently, research needs to be undertaken on 
how to value a positive social license, including how to reflect the value in a transactional agreement. 
 
Final thoughts about the Center 
 
Currently, there is no institution or entity that closely parallels the Center described above. However, the 
benefit of having such an organization becomes evident when one takes into consideration what has been 
said about a somewhat similar entity, the Center for Sustainable Shale Development (CSSD): 
“[I]nitiatives like the CSSD have a long way to go before they can claim to be genuinely influential. But 





The 2012 International Energy Association publication Are we Entering a Golden Age of Gas Special 
Report acknowledged what many thought – and continue to think – about the future of gas.  In short, “The 
future for natural gas is bright.”359 One reason for this assessment was the North American shale boom. 
And yet, despite the optimism associated with the report’s findings, IEA Chief Economist Fatih Birol 
offered a cautionary tale about the unconventional development industry. “If this new industry is to 
prosper, it needs to earn and maintain its social license to operate,” he warned.360 
 
However, three years on from that advice the picture that emerges seems very hazy at best. It is 
undeniable that some things have changed. But that observation may well be illusory in the context of the 
growing challenges that industry faces. In particular, approaches continuing to be framed in legal clashes 
as a means of ensuring the future development of unconventional oil and gas assets represent a very risky, 
and ultimately disconcerting, way for the oil and gas industry, society generally, and communities in 
particular to address their differences.  
 
Bearing in mind the highly emotional and deeply entrenched perspectives associated with 
hydraulic fracturing, “heading to court for an injunction or similar legal decision in favor of the company 
in order to overcome local community opposition…is most unlikely to resolve the situation to anyone’s 
satisfaction. It is, in fact, much more likely to create frustration and resentment within the 
community…and a shift from latent to overt conflict.”361 Moreover, the industry risks hydraulic fracturing 
bans by voter initiative as demonstrated in the heart of oil country – Denton, Texas – in 2014,362 a result 
that was described as something “many never imagined possible.”363 This is hardly a promising scenario 
                                                            
357 JOHN MORRISON, THE SOCIAL LICENSE: HOW TO KEEP YOUR ORGANIZATION LEGITIMATE 137 (2014). 
358 Fracking Fears Force US Shale Players to Act, PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, June 16, 2014. 
359 World Energy Outlook 2011, IEA, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/goldenageofgas/. 
360 IEA sets out the ‘Golden Rules’ needed to usher in a Golden Age of Gas, IEA (May 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/pressreleases/2012/may/name,27266,en.html. 
361 Ian Thomson, supra note 10. 
362 See Cumulative Report – Official Denton Country 2014 November General Election, 14, 
http://assets01.aws.connect.clarityelections.com/Assets/Connect/RootPublish/denton-
tx.connect.clarityelections.com/ElectionResults/2014/110414/denton_county_cumulative.pdf. 
363 Stephanie Joyce, supra note 8. One new story after the election suggested that “local frack bans add to investor 
concerns that shale producers confront challenges that will slow drilling.” Bradley Olson & Jim Polson, Texas 
College Town Fracking Ban a Bad Sign for U.S. Boom, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 5, 2014.  A group called “Frack Free 
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considering that the use of hydraulic fracturing “could develop into one of the most contentious 
environmental movements of our time.”364   
 
 Thus, and perhaps to the consternation of some who are entirely invested in maintaining the status 
quo despite its many limitations, the “letter of the law” approach may not be the best means of addressing 
issues that have continually defied legal resolution. This is exactly the context in which alternatives must 
be considered, and one that has significant potential is encouraging companies to seek, earn and maintain 
a social license to operate.   
 
This is not to suggest that there is not a role for the political or legal license. There definitely is.  
“However, both legal and political licenses have limitations and they are increasingly reliant on social 
license,” according to John Morrison, an SLO expert.365 Highly-respected environmental law jurist Brian 
J. Preston, Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales, has described the 
relationship between the legal and social licenses in this manner:  
 
The law may encapsulate society’s expectations to a greater or lesser degree. To the extent that 
the law does so, the business can be viewed as having a legal licence to use land and its resources. 
The legal licence sets the formal framework for obtaining and maintaining the right to use land 
and its resources and for imposing and enforcing the responsibilities and accountability for the 
exercise of that right. To the extent that the law does not do so, the business needs to rely on the 
notion of a social licence. A social licence describes the latitude or freedom that society allows 
the business to use land and its resources without interference. Society expects more of 
businesses than that they just comply with the law.366 
 
Bruce Harvey, a former Rio Tinto executive and now an adjunct professor at the Center for Responsibility 
and Mining at the University of Queensland, has made this observation:  
 
If we think about what’s happened in the world in the last 50 years, previously the resource sector 
secured its license to operate at the discretion of government. In fact, we still do. And that’s 
called a legal license and permits and license are granted and we lived up to the expectation and 
they are maintained. But in the world of globalization and in an increasing world of scrutiny and 
mobilization of local voices, if you don’t have the broad based support of local people for what 
you want to do, then you won’t get your legal license.367 
 
Understanding how to establish a social license to operate and then maintain it is admittedly not an easy 
task, but it is not impossible.368 A leading international global risk consultant has said that achieving 
social license “is time consuming and resource intensive. Everyone in a company has a role to play to 
gauge changing sentiment and emerging issues, to continuously communicate with stakeholders at all 
levels and to capture the need for changing strategies when they emerge.”369  
 
                                                            
Denton” organized the successful ballot measure. For more information about the group, see Frack Free Denton, 
http://frackfreedenton.com/. 
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However, at the outset perhaps the key factor that will underscore whether it proceeds or not lies 
in the hands of oil and gas developers. And like it or not, the industry is facing, in effect, a “social 
process” revolving around the acceptance of fracking that it not wholly within its control. No business 
willing gives up control over any aspect of its operations, but at a minimum the oil and gas industry must 
acknowledge that it cannot determine the outcome on its own. Canadian resources dispute expert Ian 
Thomson has encapsulated the situation in which the industry finds itself: “Given the speed and power 
with which social process can operate, it falls to the operating company to be proactive in understanding 
the local community, its hopes, fears and social structure, and develop a process of communication, 
consultation, and sharing that brings the various players together rather than polarizing positions and 
driving them apart.”370 
 
 The establishment of a series of Centers for the Social License to Develop in the Oil and Gas 
Industry may represent an important step in defining and deploying social license to operate. By 
assembling the parties in a neutral forum, it will aim to replace contention with consensus, and animosity 
with partnership. And, as a key part of the Center’s work, energy and resources must be invested in 
developing “shared knowledge” where all of the participants play a role in defining the issues to be 
considered.   
 
 In short, “The ingenuity and tenacity of the oil industry fueled the shale revolution. Now, the 
same ingenuity and tenacity is needed to safeguard and ensure that this newfound energy abundance is 
lasting.”371 In today’s environment, this is particularly important because when the process of establishing 
and maintaining a social license to operate is done well, the risk of disruption is minimized and the 
opportunity of business success is maximized. 
 
 Former U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill, no stranger to facing enormous challenges and 
succeeding, once remarked, “The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the 
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